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Preface
Recent world wide events have clearly demonstrated that the military response required to
the changing threat has to be dynamic, and this means the any military communications
capability has to be able to evolve and keep pace with these changing needs. Also, over the
past years there has been a merging of the technologies that are now required by both the
military to keep ahead of the threat and the commercial world where consumer demands for
greater mobility and access require new and evolving technologies. The need for advanced
technologies for military communications was a important feature of the 4th NATO Regional
Conference on Military Communication and Information Systems that was held at the Military
Communication Institute in Zegrze, Poland, between the 9th and 11th October 2002. This
conference was arranged by the Military Communication Institute, the NATO C3 Agency and
the Military University of Technology (Warsaw), and is formally endorsed by the First Deputy
Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland and the NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Defence Support, and this journal includes 11 papers from the conference that
are seen to have a wide application and convey novel and informative approaches to the
advances in new communications technologies.
The main theme of this year’s conference was The CIS (Command, Control, Communication
and Information System) challenge in the new environment, and reﬂecting the current NATO
operational priorities there was some emphasis on mobility, interoperability and standards.
Over 60 papers were presented in two parallel tracks, and a further 20 were available in
a poster session where attendees could discuss in depth speciﬁc topics with the authors. The
subject matter of the presentations ranged from academic papers on modelling and simulation,
sensor processing technologies (e.g. the use of neural networks for the identiﬁcation of
vehicles from their sound signature) and military CIS network topology to papers on speciﬁc
CIS requirements and the national programmes to support these requirements. However,
whatever application is developed to support the military planning and command chain,
an essential need is to be able to reliably and securely exchange vital information and to
disseminate the orders and operational and tactical information. This requires robust and
novel communications technologies, and the selected papers are aimed at providing an insight
into this.
With so many excellent papers it has been diﬃcult to single out any particular contribution
for special treatment, but space does not permit more that 10 to be published here. To assist
in this selection in addition to quality the chosen theme for this year’s special publication
is “Military communications technologies”, and the selected papers are intended to give the
broadest possible coverage of this theme from the papers that were presented. In every case
these papers suggest either a new approach to a problem, or give a diﬀerent and innovative
perspective that can be used to improve the ability of NATO alliance partners to interoperate
over secure and resilient communication and information system networks. Many of these
papers have been drawn from the presentations given by members of the Military University
in Warsaw, and the Military Communication Institute in Zegrze, and reﬂect the high quality
and innovative nature of the research that is undertaken by these internationally respected
institutions. Included also are a representative number of papers from other NATO nations
and agencies.
The speciﬁc topics covered in the compendium of papers attempts to address many of the
issues that now face the military communications and information systems community. The
greater emphasis on, for example, mobility is placing increased demands of transmission
technologies to provide improved reliability, wider bandwidth and more data and communi-
cations protection. This places increased demands on secure cryptographic technologies and
transmission security, and therefore the papers on the Error probability and error stream
properties in channel with slow Rician fading and Remarks on improved inversion attacks on
nonlinear filter generators are recommended reading. Quality of service is a critical factor in
reliable military networks, and with the introduction of IP based networks the management of
reliability and assurance of delivery is of growing importance. A paper has, therefore, been
included that addresses the comparison of QoS issues in ATM and IP network. Traditionally
the method of assuring interoperability was through the use of agreed data standards, but
with more nations joining NATO and the diﬀerence in national procurement and moderni-
sation cycles, a means of exchanging data between systems that use diﬀerent protocols is
needed. NATO has been developing such a system and this is described. Finally, in addition
to the provision of a secure and reliable information network, the military has a need for
eﬃcient command and control applications that do not place an unacceptable burden on
valuable bandwidth. These include the co-ordination of battleﬁeld deployment and logistic
planning and assessment and simulation tools (such as MoD-SAF), and papers are also in-
cluded that support such concepts; in particular technique that are optimised for use over
military networks.
In the limited space available it is not possible to include all the papers from the
RCMCIS’2002 conference, and in selecting only a few it is recognised that justice has not
been done to the remainder. However, the full proceedings of the conference are available
from the Military Communication Institute, Zegrze.
Guest Editors: Wojciech Burakowski, Paul Kennedy, and Marek Amanowicz
Paper Error probability
and error stream properties in channel
with slow Rician fading
Krystyna M. Noga
Abstract — In a radio communication channel wave pa-
rameters fluctuate randomly. The signal envelope undergoes
deep fades. When binary information is transmitted through
such a channel, fading causes random variation of proba-
bilities of error associated with the detection of individual
elementary signals, which produces a clustering of errors.
The paper presents an analytical description of the proba-
bility of bit error in the channel with very slow Rician fading
and Gaussian noise for noncoherent and coherent detection.
Digital systems employing error detection or error correc-
tion coding are generally based on the transmission of blocks
of N sequential bits. Expressions are given for the probabil-
ity of n errors occurring in N bits (weighted spectrum of er-
rors) and the probability of more than n errors in a block
of N bits (block error probability) for noncoherent frequency
shift keying (NCFSK). Also the calculations are presented
graphically.
Keywords — Rician fading channels, multipath propagation, bit
error probability, stream of errors, weighted spectrum of errors,
block error probability.
1. Introduction
Transmission of signal in digital radio communication sys-
tems takes place in the presence of random additive and
random multiplicative disturbances; the multiplicative dis-
turbances called ordinary as fading. We assume that the
additive disturbances are represented by white Gaussian
noise with zero mean value. The fading is considered
as nonfrequency selective. This is valid for most cases
of mobile data communications with moderate bit rates.
The fading process is assumed to be stationary and slowly
varying compared with the N bits duration; it is constant
during data block duration. We assume that the fading is
described by the Rician distribution. It is one of the double-
parameter distribution of the signal envelope allowing to
describe propagation conditions existing in radio channel
in greater detail than a simpler and more frequently ap-
plied single parameter Rayleigh distribution. The Rayleigh
and Rician distribution are only special case solutions of
the random vector problem. The Nakagami distribution
provides a more general solution.
The Rician distribution is an analytical model sufficient for
a channel where the useful signal s(t) is a sum of the sta-
tionary diffuse Gausssian signal x(t)= ax cos [w 0t+ j x(t)]
with zero mean value and the direct harmonic signal
A cos0 t, i.e.:
s(t) = A cos w 0t +ax cos

w 0t + j x(t)

=
= r cos

w 0 t + j s(t)

: (1)
The Rician model covers the superposition of a random
Rayleigh signal with the fixed nonrandom signal. The
Rician distribution can also be closely approximated by
the Nakagami distribution. The Rician fading model ap-
plies in microcellular and satellite radio communication
channels.
In radio communication channel radio waves parameters
fluctuate randomly. Data transmission from and to mo-
bile terminals suffers from fading effects caused by mul-
tipath propagation. The signal envelope undergoes deep
fades. When binary information is transmitted through such
a channel, fading causes random variation of probabilities
of error associated with the detection of individual elemen-
tary signals. Deep fades cause bursts of bit errors in the
transmitted data, i.e. errors in digital transmission over fad-
ing channels occur in bursts. In digital communication an
important quantity is the bit error probability.
This paper presents an expression for the average probabil-
ity of bit error for binary transmission in Rician channel
with noncoherent frequency shift keying (NCFSK), differ-
entially coherent phase shift keying (DPSK), coherent fre-
quency shift keying (CFSK) and coherent phase shift key-
ing (CPSK). Formulas for the average weighted spectrum of
errors and the average block error probability for NCFSK
are also presented.
2. Average probability of bit error
The static bit error probability for several common binary
modulation schemes with optimum detection of nonfading
signals in Gaussian noise is given by the formula
Ps(r ) =
8
>
<
>
:
exp( a r )
2
for NCFSK, DPSK
erfc(
p
a r )
2
for CFSK, CPSK
(2)
where: r is the instantaneous signal-to-noise power ratio
(SNR), erfc(
p
x) denotes the error function [4], a = 0:5 for
NCFSK, CFSK and a = 1 for DPSK, CPSK.
Since in the Eq. (2) the argument of the error function
appears in the lower limit of the integral, it is analytically
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difficult to perform averages of this equation. Another form
for static bit error probability is presented in [2]:
Ps(r ) =
(a r )b
G (b)
P =2
Z
0
cos j
(sin j )2b+1
exp

 a r
sin2 j

dj ; (3)
where a and b are the coefficients which depend on the
particular form of modulation and detection, i.e. a = b =
= 0:5 for CFSK, a = 0:5, b = 1 for NCFSK, a = 1, b = 0:5
for CPSK, a = b = 1 for DPSK.
Assuming Rician fading, the envelope r of the useful sig-
nal s(t), described by Eq. (1), has the probability density
function:
p(r) =
r
s
2
x
exp

 
r2 +A2
2 s 2x

I0

Ar
s
2
x

; r  0 ; (4)
where: A is the envelope of the direct component of the
useful signal s(t), s 2x is the variance of the diffused com-
ponent x(t) of the useful signal s(t), I0(a ) is the zero order
modified Bessel function of the first kind [4].
Probability density function of the square of the envelope
r(t) of the useful signal is given by the formula:
p(r2) =
1
2 s 2x
exp

 
r2 +A2
2 s 2x

I0

Ar
s
2
x

; r  0 : (5)
The average value of the square of the envelope r(t) can
be written as
E(r2) = A2 +2 s 2x ; (6)
where E(x) denotes the expected value of the argument.
From Eq. (5) we can describe the distribution of random
variable, which represents r defined as the instantaneous
ratio power of the useful signal to average power N0 of
the additive Gaussian noise, i.e. the instantaneous signal-
to-noise power ratio:
r =
r2
2N0
: (7)
The probability density function of r in Rician channel is
denoted by the formula:
p(r )=
N0
s
2
x
exp

 
2N0 r +A2
2 s 2x

I0
 
A
p
2N0 r
s
2
x
!
; r  0 :
(8)
With sufficiently slow fading, the average probability of bit
error PD(A; s x; N0), i.e. the dynamic probability of bit error,
equals to Ps(r ) averaged over the distribution of SNR r :
PD(A; s x; N0) =
¥
Z
0
Ps( r ) p(r )d r = E [Ps( r )] : (9)
Inserting Eqs. (2) and (8) into (9) gives the average prob-
ability of bit error in Rician channel [5]:
PD(A; s x; N0) =
1
2 G (b) exp

 A2
2 s 2x



¥
å
k=0

A2
2 s 2x
k
G (b+ k+1)
(k!)2 Bg(k+1; b) ; (10)
where: G (b) is the gamma function [4], g = N0
a s 2x +N0
and
Bg(x; y) is the incomplete beta function [4].
Let us introduce additional factors, which describe Rician
channel and can be defined as
r 1 =
A2
2 s 2x
; r 2 =
s
2
x
N0
; r 3 =
A2
2N0
= r 1 r 2 : (11)
Then, the expected value of the SNR r we can express as
E(r ) = r 0 = r 3 + r 2 : (12)
In literature the factor r 1 (direct signal to diffused sig-
nal power ratio) sometimes is denoted as K and r 0 (aver-
age SNR) is denoted as G [1].
In the end, the formula for the average probability of bit
error in Rician channel can be written as
PD(r 1; r 2) =
=
1
2 G (b) exp(  r 1)
¥
å
k=0
r
k
1
G (b+k+1)
(k!)2 Bg1(k+1;b) ; (13)
where g1 = 1
a r 2+1
or using the relation (12)
PD(r 1; r 0) =
1
2 G (b) exp
 
  r 1



¥
å
k=0
r
k
1
G (b+ k+1)
(k!)2 Bg2(k+1; b) ; (14)
where g2 = 1+r 1
a r 0+1+r 1
.
The error-rate formulas (10), (13), (14) are valid for four
principal cases of binary modulation in Rician channels.
The result over a Rayleigh channel can be obtained from
our results when A = 0. However, in the border case when
r 2 = 0, we have the formula for bit error probability in
channel without fading. Figure 1 presents the average bit
error probability for binary NCFSK modulation in Rician
channel as a function of r 0 for various values r 1.
For detection in the noncoherent systems (when b = 1) the
formula for the average probability of bit error in Rician
channel can be expressed as
PD(A; s x; N0) =
N0
2(a s 2x +N0)
exp

 A2 a
2(a s 2x +N0)

(15)
or
PD( r 1; r 2) =
1
2(a r 2 +1)
exp

 
a r 1 r 2
a r 2 +1

(16)
4
Error probability and error stream properties in channel with slow Rician fading
Fig. 1. The average bit error probability for NCFSK in channel
with Rician fading: 1 – r 1 =  10; 2 – r 1 = 0; 3 – r 1 = 5;
4 – r 1 = 7; 5 – r 1 = 10; 6 – r 1 = 12; 7 – r 1 = 16 (all values
in dB).
and after using the relation (12) we can rewrite it as
PD(r 1; r 0) =
1+ r 1
2( a r 0 + r 1 +1)
exp

 
a r 1 r 0
a r 0 + r 1 +1

(17)
where a = 0:5 for NCFSK and a = 1 for DPSK.
3. Average weighted spectrum
of errors
In case of digital transmission over a fading channel, time
variation causes the change of bit error probability with
the effect of clustering errors in the received signal. For-
ward error correction is often used to break up the clus-
tering [3, 7, 8]. Digital systems employing error detection
or error correction coding are generally based on the trans-
mission of blocks of N bits. The average probability of
bit error specified by Eq. (10) neither describes the num-
ber of errors nor their placement in the stream of errors.
In a communication system which transmits data in blocks
on N bits the probability of n errors in a block and the prob-
ability of more than n errors in a block are an important
quantities which describe the stream of errors in channel
with fading.
The weighted spectrum of errors, i.e., the probability
of n errors occurring in a transmission of N bits, for inde-
pendent bit errors is given by the binomial distribution
P(LN = n) =

N
n

Pns (r ) [1 Ps(r )]
N n
n = 0; 1; : : : ; N :
(18)
The average probability of n errors in a block of N bits
(average weighted spectrum of errors) is denoted as [5, 6]
PD(LN = n) =
¥
R
0
P(LN = n)p(r )dr =
=

N
n
N n
å
j=0

N n
j

( 1) jE

P j+ns (r )

: (19)
The average in Eq. (19) is formed over the instantaneous
SNR r which has the probability density function p(r )
described by Eq. (8).
Assuming that the Rician fading is very slow, nonselective
and independent, then the instantaneous SNR remains the
same over a block of N bits. For noncoherent FSK in chan-
nel with Rician fading the average weighted spectrum of
errors is given by
PD(LN = n) = 2

N
n

N0
N n
å
i=0

N n
i

( 1)i


1
2
i+n 1
(n+i)s 2x +2N0
exp
 
 A2(n+i)
2

s
2
x (n+i)+2N0

!
: (20)
Using the relations (11) and (12) we can rewrite for-
mula (20) as
PD(LN = n) = 2

N
n
N n
å
i=0

N n
i

( 1)i

1
2
i+n


1+ r 1
(n+i)r 0+2(1+ r 1)
exp

 r 1 r 0(n+i)
r 0(n+i)+2(1+ r 1)

: (21)
Equation (21) has been used to calculate the average proba-
bility of n errors in N bits. Figure 2 shows the PD(LN = n)
for N = 30 and for various values of r 1 and r 0 ; the values
of r 1 and r 0 are as taken as PD(r 1; r 0) = 10 3.
Additional, Fig. 3 shows the average weighted spectrum of
errors in N bits for NCFSK for different values of N, r 1
and r 0.
The probability PD(LN = n) takes into account only the
total number of errors and disregards their distribution. It
is useful only for the performance evaluation of random
5
Krystyna M. Noga
Fig. 2. Average probability of n errors in N = 30 bits for NCFSK:
1 – r 1 = 0, r 0 = 43; 2 – r 1 = 1, r 0 = 38; 3 – r 1 = 5, r 0 = 23;
4 – r 1 = 7, r 0 = 19; 5 – r 1 = 16, r 0 = 13 (all values in dB).
Fig. 3. Average probability of n errors in N bits for NCFSK;
solid line N = 48, dot line N = 30: 1 – r 1 = 0, r 0 = 43;
2 – r 1 = 10, r 0 = 28; 3 – r 1 = 12, r 0 = 20; 4 – r 1 = 16,
r 0 = 13 (all values in dB).
error-correcting codes. It cannot be used for burst-error-
correcting codes. If the random error-correcting code is
used, with the code capable of correcting up to n ran-
dom errors, then the probability of correct decoding is
n
å
i=0
PD(LN = i).
4. Average block error probability
When the system with burst-error correcting code is used
the probability of correct decoding cannot be expressed
only in terms of PD(LN = n). The burst-error-correction
code can correct all error vectors with length less than or
equal to n. In this case the important quantity is the average
probability of more than n errors in a block of N bits, i.e.,
average block error probability. It is denoted by
PD(LN > n) =
= 1 
n
å
i=0

N
i

¥
Z
0
Pis(r ) [1 Ps(r )]
N i p(r )dr =
= 1 
n
å
i=0

N
i
N i
å
j=0

N  i
j

( 1) jE

P j+is (r )

: (22)
Thus, from Eqs. (22), (2), (8), the average block error
probability for NCFSK we can expressed as
PD(LN > n) = 1 2N0
n
å
j=0

N
j
N  j
å
i=0

N  j
i

( 1)i


1
2
i+j 1
( j+i) s 2x +2N0
exp

 A2( j+i)
2[s 2x ( j+i)+2N0]

(23)
or in the form
PD(LN > n)=1 2
n
å
j=0

N
j
N j
å
i=0

N  j
i

( 1)i

1
2
i+j


1+ r 1
( j+i)r 0+2(1+ r 1)
exp

 r 1 r 0( j+i)
r 0( j+i)+2(1+ r 1)

: (24)
Figure 4 shows the average block error probability
PD(L30 > 0) for NCFSK, i.e., the probability of at least
one error in N = 30 bits.
When we plotted the expression (4) presented in refer-
ences [1] for D = 1, i.e. for no diversity case, we become
the same result as is shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Average block error probability PD(L30 > 0) for NCFSK
and N = 30: 1 – r 1 = 1; 2 – r 1 = 5; 3 – r 1 = 7; 4 – r 1 = 10;
5 – r 1 = 12; 6 – r 1 = 14 (all values in dB).
Fig. 5. Average block error probability PD(L30 > n) for NCFSK
and N = 30: 1 – r 1 = 0, n = 0; 2 – r 1 = 0, n = 1; 3 – r 1 = 0,
n = 4; 4 – r 1 = 5, n = 0; 5 – r 1 = 5, n = 1; 6 – r 1 = 5, n = 4;
7 – r 1 = 10, n = 0; 8 – r 1 = 10, n = 1; 9 – r 1 = 10, n = 4
(all values in dB).
Also Fig. 5 shows the average block error probability
PD(L30 > 0) in a block of N = 30 bits for NCFSK and
for various values of r 1 and n.
5. Conclusion
The presented equations are valid for nonselective, very
slow and independent Rician fading. Since the presented
expressions include results for the cases of Rayleigh fad-
ing and no fading, they can be widely used to evaluate
the performance of error control techniques for mobile
radio.
Presented results can be useful for error detection or error
correction coding. In a communication system that trans-
mits data in blocks of N bits an important quantity is the
probability of more than n errors in block. If a simple au-
tomatic repeat request scheme is used, the throughput can
be determined from PD(LN > 0), i.e. from the probabil-
ity of at least one error in blocks. However, if the use of
forward error correction is to be investigated, the knowl-
edge of PD(LN > n) is required. In case of error detection
a block is received correctly only if all N bits are received
without error.
In Figs. 1 – 5 numerical results are presented, the influence
of fading for error detection is presented. The obtained ex-
pression can easily be programmed using standard mathe-
matical software package such as Mathcad.
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Paper Remarks on improved
inversion attacks on nonlinear
filter generators
Anna Górska and Karol Górski
Abstract — The subject of this paper are inversion attacks on
stream ciphers (nonlinear filter generators), which were first
introduced by Golić [3] and extended by Golić, Clark and
Dawson [4]. These original attacks have computational com-
plexity O(2M), where M is the so-called “memory size” – dis-
tance between outer taps to filter function. In [6] we have pro-
posed improved inversion attacks which have computational
complexity O(2r m), where r denotes the length of the shift
register and m denotes the largest gap between cells with taps
to filter function or to connection polynomial. In this paper we
describe further extension of our previous results obtained by
considering shifts of the feedback polynomial which maximise
the largest gap between cells with taps to filter function or to
connection polynomial. We show that the previously proposed
set of design criteria [3, 6] does not prevent the new version
of improved inversion attack and we propose an additional
criterion based on the relationship between positions of taps
to filter function and positions of taps to the multiples of the
connection polynomial.
Keywords — stream cipher, shift register, nonlinear filter gen-
erator, inversion attack.
1. Introduction
Despite the growing importance of block ciphers, symmet-
ric stream ciphers are still one of the fundamental tools
in modern cryptography. Most designs are based on lin-
ear feedback shift registers (LFSR) combined by nonlinear
boolean functions or filtered by nonlinear boolean func-
tions (so-called nonlinear filter generators). Different vari-
ants exist: clock-controlled systems, multiplexed systems,
memory combiners and decimated generators. Our work
focuses on nonlinear filter generators (NFG) illustrated in
Fig. 1. NFG can be used on its own [1] or as a building
block in more complex generators.
Unfortunately there are no known, practical constructions
of stream ciphers which offer unconditional security or
provable computational security (the one time pad, an un-
conditionally secure stream cipher, cannot be regarded as
practical). In practice, evaluation of the security of these
ciphers is heuristic. Among the most powerful classes of
attacks on stream ciphers which have to be considered
are fast correlation attacks (beginning from [7]) and con-
ditional correlation attacks [1]. The first class was initially
used to attack combination generators but recently was
Fig. 1. Nonlinear filter generator.
successfully used to attack NFG [8]. In the second class
best results were achieved by Golić [3] who introduced
the inversion attacks (IA), which are the most powerful at-
tacks on nonlinear filter generators. In the same paper Golić
presented a set of design criteria for nonlinear filter gen-
erators which, when respected, should ensure large period,
high linear complexity and good statistical properties of
the output sequence as well as resistance to fast correla-
tion attacks, conditional correlation attacks and inversion
attacks.
In [6] we have introduced improved inversion attacks (IIA),
which can have significantly lower computational complex-
ity in comparison to basic inversion attacks. In this paper
we propose an extension of this attack and a modification
of the set of design criteria in order to prevent this new
attack.
2. Notation and definitions
Let r be LFSR length, n (n r) – denote the number of non-
degenerate input variables to filter function f (z1; : : : ; zn)
and g = (g i)i=1:::n denote the tapping sequence, an in-
creasing sequence of integers specifying positions of in-
puts to filter function, such that g 1=0 and g n  r 1. Let
M = g n  g 1 denote the memory of the filter function. Let
x = (x(t))t= r:::¥ be a binary maximum-length sequence
(x = (x(t))t= r+1:::0 denotes LFSR initial state). Then the
output sequence y = (y(t))t=0:::¥ is computed as:
y(t) = f  x(t  g 1); : : : ; x(t  yn)

: (1)
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In [3] it was proved that a filter function of one of the
following forms:
f (z1; : : : ; zn) = z1 g(z2; : : : ; zn) (2)
or
f (z1; : : : ; zn) = zn h(z1; : : : ; zn 1) (3)
will produce (independently of the tapping sequence)
a purely random output, given a purely random input, thus
making the generator resistant to conditional correlation at-
tacks.
In this case y(t) takes the following form:
y(t) = x(t  g 1) g(x(t  g 2); : : : ; x(t  g n)); (4)
or
y(t) = x(t  g n) h(x(t  g 1); : : : ; x(t  g n 1)) : (5)
Depending on the form of the function Golić proposed the
forward inversion attack and the backward inversion attack,
respectively. The average computational complexity of the
attacks is O(2M 1) and the worst case complexity is O(2M).
3. Inversion attack
The objective of the attack is to reconstruct the initial state
of the LFSR, having a segment of keystream sequence,
given the LFSR feedback polynomial, nonlinear filter func-
tion f and the tapping sequence g . If the filter function is
of the form (4) forward inversion attack is applied, which
is given by the algorithm below.
Algorithm 1 (forward inversion attack):
1. Assume (not previously checked) M bits
 
x(t)

t= M 1 of unknown initial memory state.
2. By using (4), generate
 
x(t)

t=r M 1 :::0 from
a known segment
 
y(t)

t=r M 1 :::0 of output se-
quence.
3. By using LFSR linear recursion, gener-
ate
 
x(t)

t=r M :::N 1 from first r bits of
 
x(t)

t= M:::r M 1.
4. By using (1), compute
 
y0(t)

t=r M:::N 1 from
 
x(t)

t=r 2M:::N 1 and compare with the known
 
y(t)

t=r M:::N 1. If they are the same then accept
assumed initial memory state and stop. Otherwise
go to 1.
When the filter function is of the form (5) backward inver-
sion attack is applied, which is given by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 (backward inversion attack):
1. Assume (not previously checked) M bits
 
x(t)

t= M 1:::0 of unknown initial memory
state.
2. By using (5), generate
 
x(t)

t=r M 1:::0 from
a known segment
 
y(t)

t=r M 1:::0 of output se-
quence.
3. By using LFSR linear recursion, gener-
ate
 
x(t)

t=r M :::N 1 from first r bits of
 
x(t)

t= M:::r M 1.
4. By using (1), compute
 
y0(t)

t=r M:::N 1 from
 
x(t)

t=r 2M:::N 1 and compare with the known
 
y(t)

t=r M:::N 1. If they are the same then accept
assumed initial memory state and stop. Otherwise
go to 1.
4. Improved inversion attack
The difference between the basic inversion attack and our
first proposal of the improved inversion attack [6] relies on
a modification of Steps 1 and 2. To make further improve-
ment we will include an additional preprocessing phase in
which we will find the largest gap between cells with taps
to filter function and cells with taps to connection polyno-
mial multiples (shifts of the polynomial). This idea was
first suggested by Golić [5]. In Step 1 instead of guessing
M bits of initial state we guess r m bits, where m denotes
the size of the largest gap between cells of LFSR which
have taps to filter function or to multiples of connection
polynomial (when the largest such gap is between cells j
and k, where j < k, then m= k  j). The average computa-
tional complexity of the improved attack is O(2r m 1) and
the worst case complexity is O(2r m). The algorithm of
the new attack is as follows.
Algorithm 3 (improved inversion attack with preprocessing
phase):
1. (Preprocessing phase). Find the largest gap between
cells of LFSR with taps to connection polynomial
multiples and cells with taps to filter function. De-
note the outer cells of the gap by k and k m:
Rest of the attack is identical to improved inversion attack
presented in [6]:
2. Assume (not previously checked) r   m bits
 
x(t)

t= r+1 k 1; k+m:::0 of unknown initial mem-
ory state.
3. By using (4), generate
 
x(t)

t= k k+m 1 from
a known segment
 
y(t)

t=0:::m 1 of output sequence
and the connection polynomial.
4. By using LFSR linear recursion, generate sequence
 
x(t)

t=r m:::N 1 from first r bits
 
x(t)

t= m:::r m 1.
5. By using (1), compute
 
y0(t)

t=r m:::N 1 from
 
x(t)

t=r 2m:::N 1 and compare with the known
 
y(t)

t=r m:::N 1. If they are the same then accept
assumed initial memory state and stop. Otherwise
go to 1.
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We illustrate this attack by examples.
Example 1 (improved inversion attack (IIA) – Figs. 2
and 3). Let the connection polynomial1 be:
p(x) = x130+ x63+ x56+ x35+ x28+
+x21+ x7+ x3+1 ;
the tapping sequence: g = (127;63;31;15;7;3;1;0), and let
the filter function be linear in the last variable. (If the filter
function would not be linear in any variable, which delimits
the largest gap, we should apply an inversion attack with
branching [4]). In the basic inversion attack the cryptan-
alyst needs to guess 127 bits, which gives computational
complexity of O(2127) and makes the attack infeasible. In
the improved version of the attack we only need to guess
66 bits
 
x(t)

t= 129; 128; 63;:::;0 which gives the expected
attack runtime of 266 steps.
Let us describe how our attack works in Step 2.
Fig. 2. Improved inversion attack on NFG (guessed (known)
cells are filled with grey colour).
Fig. 3. Improved inversion attack on NFG cont. (guessed (known)
cells are filled with grey colour).
First we calculate (identically as in IA) x( 127):
x( 127) = y(63)g
 
x(0); x( 1); x( 3); x( 7);
x( 15); x( 31); x( 63)

; (6)
1This feedback polynomial is very sparse, chosen to simplify the exam-
ple.
then we clock backward the register state (so the content
of cell i moves to cell i  1 and, after clocking we know
 
x(t)

t= 130; 129; 128; 64 1).
We can calculate x(0) from the connection polynomial:
x(0) = x( 3) x( 7) x( 21) x( 28)x( 35)
x( 56) x( 63) x( 130)
and then again calculate x( 127) from the knowledge of
output stream and filter function:
x( 127) = y(62)g
 
x(0); x( 1); x( 3); x( 7);
x( 15); x( 31); x( 63)

:
Then again we clock the register state left (after which we
know
 
x(t)

t= 130; 129; 128; 65 1), calculate x(0) from
a connection polynomial, and so on. We continue this
procedure until the LFSR state is reconstructed. Then we
follow testing Steps 3 and 4.
Example 2 (improved inversion attack with preprocessing
phase – Figs. 4 and 5). Let the connection polynomial be
of the following form:
p(x) = x130+ x66+ x65+ x64+ x34+ x33+ x32+ x18+
+x17+ x16+ x10+ x9+ x8+ x6+ x5+ x3+ x2+ x+1 ;
the tapping sequence: g = (127; 63;31; 15; 7; 3; 1; 0) iden-
tical to that in Example 1, and let again the filter function
be linear in the last variable. The computational complexity
of basic inversion attack is again O(2127), the complexity of
IIA is O(269) and the complexity of IIA with preprocessing
phase is O(266).
Fig. 4. Improved inversion attack with preprocessing phase
on NFG.
In the preprocessing phase we find that the largest gap be-
tween taps to connection polynomial is between cells 130
and 66 and the length of that gap is equal to 64, similar as
the gap between taps to filter function. The attack works
as follows.
First we need to guess 66 bits
 
x(t)

t=  63;:::;3, then
we calculate x( 127) from the filter function and known
keystream segment:
x( 127) = y(66)g(x(0); x( 1); x( 3); x( 7);
x( 15); x( 31); x( 63)) ;
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Fig. 5. Improved inversion attack with preprocessing phase
on NFG (known cells are marked with grey colour).
then we clock backward the register state and, after clocking
we know
 
x(t)

t=  64:::2. We calculate x( 127) from the
filter function and known keystream segment:
x( 127) = y(65)g(x(0); x( 1); x( 3); x( 7);
x( 15); x( 31); x( 63)) ;
then we calculate x(3) from the connection polynomial and
so on.
5. Nonlinear filter generators
design criteria
After introducing inversion attacks Golić [3] proposed a set
of design criteria for NFG which were considered to en-
sure large period, high linear complexity and resistance to
statistical attacks, inversion attacks, conditional correlation
attacks and fast correlation attacks. To ensure properties
from the first group (large period, high linear complexity)
primitivity of connection polynomial and large algebraic
order of function f are important. Good statistical proper-
ties can be ensured by the choice of filter function of the
form (2) or (3).
Golić pointed out the fact that the computational com-
plexity of inversion attack is exponential with the mem-
ory size M, rather than with the length of the register r.
So, to make a cipher resistant to inversion attack he pro-
posed to choose M as large as possible, preferably close to
its maximum possible value r  1. Additionally, to avoid
the possibility of effective reduction of memory size (by
decimation technique), the tapping sequence should not be
equidistant, preferably the greatest common divisor of ele-
ments of g should be equal to one (assuming g 1 = 0).
Resistance to conditional correlation attacks requires the
number of nondegenerate inputs to f to be large enough,
and the g sequence chosen according to a full or l -order
positive difference set (with l as small as possible for given
n and r) and correlation immunity of f to be relatively large
compared to l .
To prevent fast correlation attack designers should ensure
that the nonzero correlation coefficients of f to the set of
linear functions are relatively small and close in magnitude.
Finally, the number of nonzero terms in the feedback poly-
nomial and in any of its low degree multiples should not
be small.
The polynomial, tapping sequence and filter function used
in Example 1 meet the above criteria. So, as we can see
this set of design criteria does not prevent improved inver-
sion attacks. So we propose to add the following criterion
to the set:
Designers of stream ciphers should additionally min-
imise the largest gap between cells with taps to multiples
of the connection polynomial or to the filter function.
6. Experiments
We have implemented the basic inversion attack and the
improved inversion attack and we have conducted the fol-
lowing experiments on a typical Pentium II 400 MHz PC
with 128 MB RAM:
1. Attacks on NFG with connection polynomial p(x) =
=x33x131, tapping sequence g =f31;15;7;3;1;0g
and filter function f (x31x15x7x3x1x0) = x31x15x3
x7x1 x3x1x0 for different initial states. Inversion
attack on this generator takes up to few days and im-
proved inversion attack takes up to 20 seconds (de-
pending on initial state of the LFSR).
2. Attacks on NFG with connection polynomial
p(x) = x64  x4  x3  x1  1, tapping sequence
g = f63; 31; 15; 7; 3; 1; 0g and filter function
f (x63x31x15x7x3x1x0) = x63  x31  x15x3  x7x1 
x3x1x0. Inversion attack has computational com-
plexity O(263) so it is infeasible to conduct it on
our PC. Improved inversion attack takes up to few
days.
7. Conclusions and final remarks
We have proposed a powerful improvement of the inversion
attacks. We have conducted several experiments which have
confirmed theoretical predictions.
This attack is also effective when instead of regular LFSR,
a modular LFSR is used (with inter cell feedback).
Our further research will concentrate on possible transfor-
mations of filter functions in such a way as to maximise
the largest gap.
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Paper The tactical Intranet IPSec
security concept
Mariusz Bednarczyk, Jacek Jarmakiewicz, and Jarosław Krygier
Abstract — The IPSec protocols architecture that can be ap-
plied in tactical Intranet based on the IPv6 protocol stack for
wireless environment is the subject of the paper. The potential
usefulness of the new version of IP protocol is very important
for tactical communication systems. Additionally, Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) security working group pro-
poses recommendations covering the RFC 2401, 2402, 2406,
that describe the security architecture for Internet Proto-
col. These standards, published by IETF are discussed here
in military requirements context. The NATO C3 Technical
Architecture model also recommends these issues. The con-
cept of the IPSec architecture in military systems is described
in the paper. The position of the security applications de-
signed for subscriber devices with reference to layered model
is also presented. The concept presented here is defined for
the tactical level.
Keywords — IPSec, tactical Intranet, IP security.
1. Introduction
The modern Armed Forces need modern solutions, espe-
cially in the area of communication systems. For example,
local area networks (LAN) have became just essential part
of contemporary military units (command posts). Along
with commercial of the shelf products (COTS) application,
their security have became very important factor that have
to be taken into account. The new standard covering the
IPv6 protocol, that is still tested, includes mechanisms suit-
able for military systems. It is associated with security
mechanisms (authentication, privacy and payload encryp-
tion) and mobile subscribers access to services and network
resources as well as with the high quality of services re-
quirements [6, 7].
The IPv6 have been designing as an evolution from IPv4
rather than as a major change. Useful features of IPv4
were carried over in IPv6 and less useful features were
dropped. According to the IPv6 specification, the changes
from IPv4 to IPv6 can be split primarily into the following
categories [4]:
 Inherent security support. The IPv6 enables and
enforces the IPSec authentication and encryption fea-
tures through the extension headers. If authentication
header (AH) is carried with the IP datagram, the re-
ceiving host must check the packet validity.
 Mobility support. The IPv6 protocol supports mo-
bility management as an inherent function of IPv6
compared to the IPv4 that supports mobility through
an additional protocol added on a top of IPv4 [5].
 Built-in route optimization. In IPv6 the correspon-
dent node (CN) can learn so-called care-of-address
(COA) of the mobile node (MN). The route optimiza-
tion helps to prevent a problem of triangle routing.
In triangle routing an incoming to MN traffic always
passes through the home agent (HA), what can cause
undesirable increasing the traffic load in the home
network. Inherent route optimization is a major im-
provement compared to the IPv4 mobility protocol,
which specifies route optimization as a separate ex-
tension to the mobility protocol. More importantly,
all IPv6 nodes support route optimization while only
mobile nodes in IPv4 can support the mobility ex-
tension.
The very large address space of IPv6 is the best-known
feature of this protocol, but it is less interesting for mil-
itary environment that has a relatively small dedicated
Internet. The rich address formats are architecturally in-
teresting: multicast supporting conferencing and broadcast
applications; anycast supporting such activities as “use the
nearest server”. The attractiveness of such facilities is prin-
cipally used to reduce the management of the network and
bandwidth requirements as well. The auto-configuration fa-
cility could also reduce the running costs of the network as
the address assignment can occur without participation of
network administrator. However, this raise a security con-
cern in loss of administrative control over the allocation of
addresses in the network.
Tactical military networks are predominantly radio based
and “on the move” with minimal fixed infrastructure. Also,
security and mobility efficiency play essential role from
military point of view.
The detailed background of the tactical Intranet structure
that uses IPv6 protocol stack discussed here is clarified
in [3] and [8]. The authors have limited the discussion
only to the security problem that is applied to the tactical
environment, treated the tactical network as a non-secure
medium (denoted in the figures as a cloud).
2. The IPSec features
Security features of IPv6 have been obtained mainly by
means of two dedicated extension header [1, 2]: authenti-
cation header (AH) and encrypted security payload (ESP)
with complementary capabilities.
The AH header was designed to ensure authenticity and
integrity of the IP packet. Its presence guards against
two threats: the fixed fields illegal modification and packet
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spoofing. On the other hand, the ESP header provides data
encapsulation with encryption in order to ensure that only
the destination node can read the payload conveyed by the
IP packet. The two headers can be used together to provide
all the security features simultaneously (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Combining privacy and authentication: (a) encryp-
tion before authentication; (b) authentication before encryption.
Explanations: IP-H – IP based header plus extensions headers,
AH – authentication header, ESP-H – encapsulating security pay-
load header, ET – encapsulating security payload trailing fields.
Both the AH and the ESP headers use a concept of the
security association (SA) to agree on the security algo-
rithms and parameters between the sender and the receiver.
In general, each IPv6 node manages a set of SAs, one for
each currently active secure communication. The security
parameters index (SPI) is a parameter contained in both the
AH and ESP headers to specify which SA will be used in
decryption and/or authentication the packet.
In unicast transmissions, the SPI is normally chosen by
the destination node and sent back to the sender when the
communication is set up. In multicast transmissions, the
SPI must be common to all the members of the multi-
cast group. Each node must be able to identify the right
SA correctly by combining the SPI with the multicast
address.
The negotiation of the SA (and the related SPI) is an
integral part of the protocol for the exchange of security
keys.
Correct application of the AH and ESP headers requires
that all the communicating parties agree on a common key
to be used in forming and checking the security headers.
The IPv6 allows key management to occur either out-of-
band or with specifically crafted protocols. However, no
general agreement has been reached yet on this subject
within the Internet community, with different groups stress-
ing different needs: fast key exchange, strong authentica-
tion, lightweight protocols, and others. Key management
is the area that is still mostly unsettled within the whole
IPSec architecture.
The IPv6 requires each implementation to allow for man-
ual setting of the security keys, in case of no in-line key
management technique is adopted or human-based security
is desired. Obviously, manual keying is possible only if
the security administrators have separately agreed out-of-
band on the keys to be used – for example, at a reserved
meeting. This solution exhibits high personnel costs and
does not scale well because it requires personal action of
an operator on each network device taking part in the secure
channel. Additionally, it can generate a false sense of secu-
rity. The human intervention does not automatically ensure
a higher level of security, due to untrusted administrators
and residual problems related to hardware and software in-
tegrity of the device where the key is set. However, in spite
of these disadvantages, manual key management finds ap-
plication in restricted environments, with a small number
of devices physically secured, that according to the security
policy, can operate only when explicitly enabled by human
intervention.
Within the IPSec, key management is surely the area that is
less settled and the area in which much work has yet to be
done before arriving at a set of protocols that completely
meet the security needs at the IP level. The only decision
that has already been made is that, for the sake of general-
ity, the Internet key management protocol (IKMP) will be
placed at the application layer, and it will be independent
of the protocols at the lower layers.
The first proposal is to base IKMP on the coupling of the
Internet security association and key management proto-
col (ISAKMP) and Oakley protocols, as described in the
IEFT Draft, the resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley.
The ISAKMP defines a generic architecture for authenti-
cated SA setup and key exchange, without specifying the
actual algorithms to be used. In this way, it can be used
with different key exchange techniques.
Oakley is a key-exchange protocol, based on a modified
version of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Therefore, it is
one of the natural partners for ISAKMP.
However, in addition to the ISAKMP-Oakley couple, dif-
ferent solutions are being proposed. Currently, the ma-
jor competitor is simple key-management for Internet Pro-
tocols (SKIP), which bases its operations on the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm. The SKIP is simple and addresses sev-
eral problems of key management in high-speed networks,
such as zero-message key setup and updates that permit fast
dynamic rekeying (that is, frequent in-line change of the se-
curity keys to avoid analytic attacks based on accumulation
of cyphertext encrypted with the same key). Moreover,
although SKIP is not standardized yet, it already features
many commercial-level implementations, both for UNIX
workstations and for personal computers.
So the war of the key-management protocols is raging, and
the likely outcome is that more than one protocol will attain
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RFC status, because these protocols exhibit different merits
that are valuable in different application environments.
3. Tactical Intranet security
The AH and ESP headers can be used in different ways to
protect IP transmission.
In IPv6, achieving good level of security is easier and more
standard than in IPv4, thanks to the AH and ESP headers.
As an example, with reference to Fig. 2, let us suppose
that a TCP session (channel) between host denoted H1
in network named N1 and host H2 in network N2 has
to be protected only against data manipulation and origin
falsification, while data privacy is not required. In this
case, the AH header can be used in the following way.
The firewall FW1 gets the IP packet and modifies it by
adding an AH header before sending it to its partner fire-
wall FW2. When this packet is received by the FW2, it
checks the packet for integrity and origin authentication
using the SPI data in the AH header. If the test is success-
ful, then the IP header and the AH header are removed,
and the remaining data (that is, the original packet) are
sent to the final destination.
Fig. 2. An example of the tunnel between two firewalls.
If the network is implemented using only the AH header,
then attackers can neither alter the transmitted packets
nor insert forged packets in the channel. However, they
can still read the content of the packets. To prevent dis-
closure of the payload, the ESP header has to be used too.
Even the usage of AH in conjunction with ESP does not
completely protect the traffic. Packets can be deleted by
intermediate nodes or recorded and later replayed. These
attacks cannot be easily contrasted at the IP level. Appro-
priate defenses (such as the use of unique packet identifiers
and the generation of heartbeat packets) are usually placed
at some upper level in the network stack. A partial solu-
tion at the IP level is likely to be offered by the new format
and algorithms that are going to replace the current ones in
the AH header.
In contrast to the IPv4, there is no problem with fragmen-
tation in IPv6, because the overhead is fixed in size (the
dimension of AH, or that of AH plus ESP) and fragmenta-
tion process is realized in source host.
This technique can be adopted even between the firewall
and the single external host (Fig. 3). Obviously, this case
is very important for guaranteed security when a mobile
host is used outside the protected network, and it is a per-
fect complement to the mobility support features of IPv6.
The firewall will act as a home agent in the neighbor discov-
ery procedure. Mobile host will be assigned two different
IP addresses: one when it is connected inside the security
perimeter of the network and the other one when it is out-
side this perimeter. In second case, the firewall will also
act as a relay, by routing packets coming from inside the
corporate network to the external address, after adding the
required headers (AH only, or AH plus ESP).
Fig. 3. Tunnel between a firewall and a single host.
This solution is not complete for application-level security
because only partial protection is obtained. AH provides
only host-based authentication, whereas applications usu-
ally require user-based authentication. Moreover, AH and
ESP protect the data only during their transmission along
the channel. After the data have been received, they are
no longer protected in any way. This fact may not be
relevant if the receiving host is a secure one, but there
is the additional implication that origin authentication and
data integrity properties are lost as well. So formal non-
repudiation cannot occur after the data have been extracted
from the secure channel.
The conclusion is that the security features of IPv6 do not
eliminate the need for other security mechanisms, which
will probably be better placed at the application level. Net-
worked applications executing on the top of the IPv6 stack
may be required in order to use the communication channel
with specific features. To avoid duplication of functionality
(and hence performance degradation) being able to spec-
ified at the transport layer, the security attributes of the
created channel are useful.
Since IP addresses in the IPv6 are quite often dynamically
assigned, it is the most importance that this process be done
in a secure fashion.
Moreover, as different security properties are available
through a proper combination of AH and ESP headers, it
is highly desirable that they should be applied to the mes-
sages exchanged by the routers, to prevent attacks aiming
to subvert the logical architecture of the network.
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Following types of communications should be pro-
tected:
 The routing advertisement messages, to ensure that
they are sent by an authorized router.
 The neighbor advertisement messages, to ensure that
they come from authorized hosts and to avoid a risk
that somebody attaches a new host to the network
without proper authorization.
 The ICMP messages related to an unreachable host
or network (destination unreachable) or to a better
route (redirect), to ensure that these messages come
from hosts or routers that were on the original path
of the packets.
Securing these types of messages is surely not trivial. For
example, the routing advertisements are sent to a multicast
group; therefore, all the routers in the group have to know
the (common) secret key to be used to verify and/or de-
crypt the messages. This fact implies that they can forge
messages and impersonate any router in the group.
Protection of the neighbor advertisements is a serious prob-
lem. These messages can be protected only after the SA
has been created between the host and the address distribu-
tion center. On the other hand, this SA can be created only
after the address has been assigned to the host, so we can
conclude that this is no correct solution. The break of the
loop is possible. For example, priority can be given to the
address assignment phase, and SA setup can be permitted
only subsequently, but in this way the address assignment
phase is not protected. Alternatively, public key authentica-
tion can be used. Each host is assigned a key pair (private
and public key) and has to be reconfigured with the public
key of the authority that signs the certificates of the routers
and the address distribution centers. The last alternative is
to configure the routers so that they do not advertise local
prefixes. In this way, each host is forced to contact a router
first.
Protection against malicious ICMP messages requires that
they should be protected by the AH header, but this ap-
proach has the drawback of requiring the establishment of
the SA with each router and host on the path between the
source and the destination of the packets.
With respect to the messages security used by the various
routing protocols, they should always be exchanged just
within the frame of the SA and should be protected by
the AH. For the sake of generality, this solution is highly
preferable to using authentication mechanisms specific for
each routing protocol.
Based on the previous analyses, we can conclude that rout-
ing security is apparently still a big problem in IPv6, but
chances of solving this problem are higher than in IPv4.
4. Conclusions
The tactical military architecture is a hierarchical arrange-
ment of mobile components. The degree of users mobility
varies with the echelon and the distance from the front. The
nature of military operations is such a changing that sig-
nificant advantage will be achieved by the creative, timely
and decisive usage of the information. Consequently, the
demand for access to the information is also changing and
evolving towards the new network-centric model based on
more comprehensive, ubiquitous and shared information
services.
From military point of view, there is no problem with ad-
dress space exhaustion in the internal networks, as they are
largely closed networks. Additionally, since such networks
are relatively small, the problem with big routing tables
does not exist.
The security features of IPv6 offer only commercial grade
of security. Specific hardware encryption have to be added
in military domain.
The IETF security architecture is open to apply additional
encryption applications. Several solutions exist clarifying
how the IPSec may be implemented to hosts in conjunction
with the router or firewall. Some solutions are integrated
into the native IP implementations and other ones are build-
in according to bump-in-the-stack (BITS) or bump-in-the-
wire (BITW) scheme [1, 9]. The second scheme enables to
use an outboard crypto processor that is common designed
feature of the security in military network.
Currently, the AH and ESP headers should be modified
along the following guidelines:
 The AH format must be substantially changed to
accommodate new and stronger authentication al-
gorithms (HMAC – keyed-hashing for message au-
thentication [10]) that support prevention of packet
replay and its cancellation ([11] describes this
format when used with the MD5 digest algorithm).
 The ESP specification must achieve a better orthog-
onality with algorithms, to simplify application of
different encryption algorithms.
The benefit of these changes is that higher security will be
available at the network level. Hence, applications will be
able to concentrate on different security aspects, such as
authorizations.
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Paper A study of differences between
bent functions constructed using
Rothaus method and randomly
generated bent functions
Anna Grocholewska-Czuryło
Abstract — Bent functions, having the highest possible non-
linearity, are among the best candidates for construction of
S-boxes. One problem with bent functions is the fact that they
are hard to find among randomly generated set of Boolean
functions already for 6 argument functions. There exist some
algorithms that allow for easy generation of bent functions.
The major drawback of these algorithms is the fact that they
rely on deterministic dependencies and are only able to gen-
erate bent functions belonging to one specific class. In our
paper we present an efficient generator of random bent func-
tions of more than 4 arguments. Resulting functions are not
bounded by constraints described above. The generator oper-
ates in algebraic normal form domain (ANF). We also present
our result on comparing the performance of S-boxes build us-
ing our bent function generator versus a standard method of
bent function construction. We also give some directions for
further research.
Keywords — block ciphers, S-boxes, bent functions, construc-
tion, random generation, nonlinearity.
1. Introduction
In block ciphers based on S-boxes, the cryptographic
strength (i.e. resistance to cryptanalysis attack) depends
on the nonlinear properties of an S-boxes used to build
the cipher. S-boxes are built from Boolean functions, so
quality of each and every function constituting an S-box is
of a greatest importance. Another major consideration for
S-box construction is the way functions that form an S-box
“interact” (behave as a group of functions) – what are the
cryptographic properties of an S-box as a whole. These are
two main factors that affect cipher’s cryptographic perfor-
mance.
The properties of Boolean functions have been extensively
studied. The quality of a single, cryptographically strong
Boolean function is measured by its cryptographic proper-
ties. The criteria against which a function quality is mea-
sured are mainly nonlinearity, balancedness, avalanche and
propagation criteria.
The qualities that single Boolean functions should posses
to be good candidates for S-box construction are very sim-
ilar to those that should be characterizing a good (strong)
S-box (taken as a linear combination of constituting func-
tions). The nonlinear properties are by far the most impor-
tant. In recent years a class of highly nonlinear functions
attracted a lot of researchers’ attention – a class of bent
Boolean functions. These functions have in fact the high-
est possible nonlinearity (they also have very good prop-
agation characteristics and are nearly balanced – another
important criterion for good cryptographic function – spe-
cial algorithm have been proposed by different authors for
transforming bent functions into balanced Boolean func-
tions while maintaining high level of nonlinearity).
However one major drawback is the fact that bent functions
are not easily constructed (i.e. their constructions are time
consuming). Trying to find bent functions by pure random
search is also virtually impossible (already for 6-argument
functions, only one in 2:9 10 10 Boolean functions is bent).
Also, an S-box that is constructed using only bent functions
does not necessarily possess the best nonlinear qualities.
So usually a number of different S-boxes should be gener-
ated and tested, and then only the best S-boxes should be
selected for incorporating in block cipher. This approach
demands fast S-box generation which in turn translates to
fast bent function generation.
The remainder concentrates on efficient random bent func-
tion generation and using such generated function for S-box
construction.
2. Preliminaries
We use square brackets to denote vectors like [a1; : : : ;an]
and round brackets to denote functions like f (x1; : : : ;xn).
Boolean function. Let GF(2) =<
å
;; > be two-
element Galois field, where
å
= f0;1g;  and  denotes
the sum and multiplication mod 2, respectively. A func-
tion f :
å
n
!
å
is an n-argument Boolean function. Let
z = x1  2n 1 + x2  2n 2 + : : :+ xn  20 be the decimal rep-
resentation of arguments (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) of the function f .
Let us denote f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) as yz. Then [y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1]
is called a truth table of the function f .
Linear and nonlinear Boolean functions. An n-argument
Boolean function f is linear if it can be represented in the
following form: f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) = a1x1  a2x2  : : :anxn.
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Let Ln be a set of all n-argument linear Boolean func-
tions. Let Mn = fg : å n ! å j g(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) = 1 
f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) and f 2Lng. A set An =Ln [ Mn is called
a set of n-argument affine Boolean functions. A Boolean
function f :
å
n
!
å
that is not affine is called a nonlinear
Boolean function.
Balance. Let N0[y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1] be a number of ze-
ros (0’s) in the truth table [y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1] of func-
tion f , and N1[y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1] be number of ones (1’s).
A Boolean function is balanced if N0[y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1] =
= N1[y0;y1; : : : ;y2n 1].
Algebraic normal form. A Boolean function can also
be represented as a maximum of 2n coefficients of the
algebraic normal form. These coefficients provide a for-
mula for the evaluation of the function for any given input
x = [x1;x2; : : : ;xn]:
f (x) = a0
n
å
i=1
aixi å
1i< jn
ai jxix j : : :a12:::nx1x2 : : :xn;
where
å
; denote the modulo 2 summation.
The order of nonlinearity of a Boolean function f (x)
is a maximum number of variables in a product term
with non-zero coefficient aJ, where J is a subset of
f1;2;3; : : : ;ng. In the case where J is an empty set the
coefficient is denoted as a0 and is called a zero order coeffi-
cient. Coefficients of order 1 are a1; a2; : : : ;an, coefficients
of order 2 are a12;a13; : : : ;a
(n 1)n, coefficient of order n is
a12:::n. The number of all ANF coefficients equals 2n.
Let us denote the number of all (zero and non-zero) coef-
ficients of order i of function f as s i( f ). For n-argument
function f there are as many coefficients of a given or-
der as there are i-element combinations in n-element set,
i.e. s i( f ) =
 
n
i

.
Hamming distance. Hamming weight of a binary vector
x 2
å
n, denoted as hwt(x), is the number of ones in that
vector.
Hamming distance between two Boolean functions f ;g :
å
n
!
å
is denoted by d( f ;g) and is defined as follows:
d( f ;g) =
å
x2
å
n
f (x)g(x):
The distance of a Boolean function f from a set of
n-argument Boolean functions Xn is defined as follows:
d ( f ) = min
g2Xn
d( f ;g);
where d( f ;g) is the Hamming distance between functions
f and g. The distance of a function f from a set of affine
functions An is the distance of function f from the nearest
function g 2 An.
The distance of function f from a set of all affine func-
tions is called the nonlinearity of function f and is denoted
by N f .
Bent functions. A Boolean function f :
å
n
!
å
is perfectly
nonlinear if and only if f (x) f (x a ) is balanced for any
a 2
å
n such that 1 hwt(a ) n.
For a perfectly nonlinear Boolean function, any change of
inputs causes the change of the output with probability
of 1/2.
Meier and Staffelbach [16] proved that the set of per-
fectly nonlinear Boolean functions is the same as the set of
Boolean bent functions defined by Rothaus [5].
Perfectly nonlinear functions (or bent functions) have the
same, and the maximum possible distance to all affine func-
tions. So their correlation to any affine function is consis-
tently bad (minimal). Linear cryptanalysis works if it is
possible to find a good linear approximation of the S-box.
Bent functions are not balanced. This property prohibits
their direct application in S-box construction, however there
exist numerous methods for modifying bent function in
such a way so that the resulting function is balanced and
still maintains the good cryptographic properties of a bent
function [16]. Hamming weight of a bent function equals
2n 12n=2 1.
Differential analysis [18] can be seen as an extension of
the ideas of attacks based on the presence of linear struc-
tures [3]. As perfect nonlinear Boolean function have
maximum distance to the class of linear structures (equal
to 2n 2), they are a useful class of functions for construct-
ing mappings that are resistant to differential attacks.
Bent functions exist only for even n. The nonlinear order
of bent functions is bounded from above by n=2 for n > 2.
The number of Boolean bent function for n > 6 remains an
open problem.
3. Constructing bent functions
There exist a number of algorithms for constructing bent
functions. As an example let’s consider the follow-
ing [8, 12].
Method 1. Let Bn denote a set of bent functions f : å n ! å
with n even. Given a set of bent functions B6, bent func-
tions in B8 can be constructed using the following method
(Method 1).
Let a;b 2 B6. Then the function f : å 8 ! å defined by:
f (x0 : : : ;x7) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
a(x0 : : :x5); x6 = 0; x7 = 0
a(x0 : : :x5); x6 = 0; x7 = 1
b(x0 : : :x5); x6 = 0; x7 = 0
b(x0 : : :x5); 1; x6 = 0; x7 = 0
is bent [8]. Rearrangements of the 64 blocks in the expres-
sion above also result in bent functions.
Another method for bent function construction was given
by Rothaus in [5].
Method 2. Let x = (x1; : : : ;xn) and let a(x); b(x) and c(x)
be bent functions such that a(x)b(x) c(x) is also bent.
Then a function f (x;xn+1;xn+2) = a(x)b(x) b(x)c(x)
c(x)a(x) [a(x)b(x)]xn+1 [a(x) c(x)]xn+2 xn+1xn+2
is bent.
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Most of the known bent function constructions take bent
functions of n arguments as their input and generate bent
functions of n+2 arguments. One major drawback of these
methods is the fact that they are deterministic. Only short
bent functions (n = 4 or 6) are selected at random and the
resulting function is obtained using the same, deterministic
formula every time. Even if there is some “random” ele-
ment in such generation (like adding a linear term to the
resulting bent function) it does not bring any new quality
to the generated function.
4. Generating bent functions
To overcome some of the limitations and possible weak-
nesses of the bent functions construction methods described
above a new algorithm of random bent functions generation
have been proposed [24].
As already mentioned earlier, drawing bent functions at ran-
dom is not feasible already for small number of arguments
(n > 6). To make such generation possible, an algorithm
was designed that generates random Boolean functions in
algebraic normal form thus making use of some basic prop-
erties of bent functions to considerably narrow the search
space. This makes the generation of bent functions feasible
for n  8 even on a standard PC machine. The algorithm
for the generation of bent functions in ANF domain takes
as its input the minimum and maximum number of ANF
coefficients of every order that the resulting functions are
allowed to have. Since the nonlinear order of bent functions
is less or equal to n=2, clearly in ANF of a bent function
cannot be any ANF coefficient of order higher then n=2.
This restriction is the major reason for random generation
feasibility, since it considerably reduces the possible search
space.
The number of ANF coefficients of orders less or equal
to n=2 can be fixed or randomly selected within allowed
range (i.e. between 0 and s ( f ) =  ni

for order i). If the
number of coefficients for a given order i is fixed then all
generated functions will have the same number of coeffi-
cients of that order, but the coefficients themselves will be
different in each generated function. If the number of co-
efficients for a given order i is randomly selected then all
generated functions will not only have different coefficients
but also the number of coefficients of order i will vary from
function to function. It is of course possible to fix the num-
ber of coefficients for some orders and have varied number
of coefficients for other orders.
One important consequence of this approach is the possi-
bility of prohibiting the generation of bent functions which
are merely a linear transformations of other bent functions.
This is easily achieved by setting the number of coefficients
of order 0 and 1 to 0. So in the ANF of the resulting func-
tions there will be no linear part. Bent functions of any
order can be generated with this method, simply by set-
ting any higher order coefficients to 0. Homogenous bent
functions can also be generated easily.
One drawback of the method is the fact that it does not
guarantee the generation of bent functions without repeti-
tions, although the chance of generating two identical bent
functions is minimal with any reasonably selected ranges
of number of ANF coefficients. However, if avoiding repe-
titions is an absolute requirement, the set of generated bent
functions must be checked for duplicates.
The limitations of this approach are twofold. First there
is a feasibility limit. Number of possible functions grows
with the number of coefficients of higher orders (i> 2) and
generating a bent function quickly becomes infeasible. So
the algorithm works best with the low number of higher or-
der coefficients (e.g. < 6 for n = 8 and order i = 3 and 4).
Due to the above limitation, this method does not gener-
ate all possible bent functions with equal probability. In
principle, it would be possible but is not feasible for the
reason described above. One has to limit the number of
higher order coefficients and at the same time prohibit the
generation of some bent functions.
5. Comparing pairs of bent functions
In this section some comparative results are presented.
Three sets of 8 argument bent Boolean functions are an-
alyzed: bent functions constructed using Method 1, bent
functions constructed using method given in [22] (Maio-
rana functions with permuted inputs) and randomly gen-
erated bent functions. For random, distinct i; j the non-
linearity of fi  f j was calculated. Figures 1 and 2
show the resulting nonlinearity distribution (in percentage).
Fig. 1. Pairs nonlinearity distribution. Constructed bent
(Method 1) versus generated bent.
The random bent functions were generated with the fol-
lowing parameters: number of 2nd order coefficients was
between 7 and 14 (statistically that yields the highest num-
ber of bent functions), number of 3rd order coefficients
was fixed at 2 and number of 4th order ANF coefficients
was also fixed at 2. There were no coefficients of order
0 and 1 to prevent the occurrences of bent functions that
would be just a linear transformations of one another.
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Fig. 2. Pairs nonlinearity distribution. Constructed bent (per-
muted Maiorana) versus generated bent.
For randomly generated functions the distribution is shifted
towards higher values (i.e. pairs have better nonlinearity)
and is also much more narrow - more appropriate pairs can
be found in this set of functions. The results obtained in
our experiments are also better then those presented in [22]
for a special subsets of bent functions: Maiorana functions
with permuted inputs.
6. Comparing S-boxes
In this section we present some properties of S-boxes build
using randomly generated bent function. We give com-
parative results of the performance of S-boxes build of
bent functions constructed using a method introduced by
Rothaus [5] (Method 2 from Section 3), bent functions
generated with our algorithm described in this paper and
random Boolean functions (not bent). Two properties of
S-boxes were measured: feasibility of a linear approxima-
tion which is a measure of S-box resistance against linear
cryptanalysis and nonlinearity of the S-box which is one of
the major criteria of cryptographic quality.
One has to note that for “real-life” applications bent func-
tions would have to be modified to be balanced prior to
their use in S-boxes. Such modification algorithms are be-
yond the scope of this paper, where main focus is kept on
bent functions.
6.1. Linear approximations of S-boxes
We used a method of linear approximation as described
in [23].
By linear approximation of a Boolean function h :
å
n
!
å
m,
written as Y = h(X), we mean any equation of the form:
å
i2Y 0
yi = å
j2X 0
x j; for Y
0
 f1;2; : : : ;mg; X 0  f1;2; : : : ;ng;
fulfilled with the probability of p = N(X 0;Y 0)=2n, where
N(X 0;Y 0) denotes the number of pairs (X ;Y ) fulfilling the
equation, and
å
is a modulo 2 summation. The sets if
indices X 0;Y 0 are called input and output masks.
The measure of linear approximation effectiveness is
the value of a probability D p = jp  1=2j called differ-
ential probability. For a fixed n a measure of effec-
tiveness can also be defined as a value of D N(X 0;Y 0) =
= jN(X 0;Y 0) 2n 1j.
In our experiment we tested linear approximations of
6 x 6 S-boxes, i.e. functions Y = h(X) :
å
6
!
å
6,
where sub-functions of function h were constructed bent
functions, randomly generated bent functions and random
functions (Fig. 3). The distribution of the best approx-
imations was tested, i.e. maximum value of D N(X 0;Y 0)
among all possible sets of input and output masks (ex-
cept empty output mask). For each type of functions
10 000 of random S-boxes were tested. The number
of S-boxes is given on Y (value) axis. The X (cate-
gory) axis gives the values of the best approximations
(higher value means better approximation so worse S-box).
Fig. 3. Best S-box approximation distribution. Constructed
(Rothaus) versus generated bent.
Differences between S-boxes build of bent functions con-
structed using Rothaus method (Method 2) and S-boxes
build from randomly generated bent functions are not very
evident.
6.2. Nonlinearity
Now we will show the results of testing the S-boxes for
high nonlinearity (Fig. 4). We consider 6 x 8 S-boxes (each
S-box is constructed of six 8-argument functions).
The nonlinearity of an S-box, so a function F :
å
n
!
å
m
such that F(x) =
  f1(x); f2(x); : : : ; fm(x)

i x 2
å
n, is cal-
culated as minimal nonlinearity of all linear combinations
of F’s sub-functions. The nonlinearity of a S-box is then
defined as follows:
NF = min

NfJ j fJ = åi2J
fi; J  (1;2; : : : ;m)
	
:
To calculate a nonlinearity of a single S-box 2m linear com-
binations have to be constructed and their distance to affine
functions calculated. The lowest of all calculated nonlin-
earities (distances to affine functions) is the nonlinearity of
the S-box.
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Fig. 4. S-box nonlinearity distribution. Constructed (Rothaus)
versus generated bent.
Among S-boxes built from generated bent functions there
exist S-boxes of the highest found nonlinearity of 104.
There is also about 20 times more S-boxes of very high
nonlinearity of 100 then in the case of S-boxes build from
constructed bent functions or random balanced functions.
This means that using randomly generated bent functions
may lead to constructing S-boxes of better cryptographic
qualities in less time.
However, one has to note the fact that in case of randomly
generated bent functions there are also S-boxes of relatively
poor nonlinearity (like 80). So building S-boxes from these
functions requires (more then in other cases) careful check-
ing the resulting S-boxes for possibly low nonlinearity.
7. Conclusions
From the results presented in this paper it seems that ran-
dom generated bent functions offer an interesting alternative
to construction methods. Not only nonlinear characteristics
of these functions are equal or better then those of con-
structed bent functions but also generated functions have
a very compact (small) algebraic normal form which can
be utilized for efficient storage and fast cryptographic rou-
tines.
Next step in randomly generated bent function assessment
will be checking their avalanche and propagation criteria,
also when incorporated into S-boxes.
Perhaps a combined method of ANF generation of rela-
tively short bent functions (i.e. n 10) and then supplying
them as an input for deterministic construction can yield
some interesting results. Such functions would also have
to be tested to verify their possibly superior cryptographic
qualities.
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Abstract — Now, a network operator must choose between
two packet switched technologies for providing QoS in WAN
networks, which are ATM and IP QoS [3, 4, 9]. As ATM has
reached the maturity with capabilities for offering a number of
different network services (i.e. CBR, VBR, ABR, UBR, GFR),
the IP QoS with network services like expedited forwarding,
assured forwarding, etc. is still at developing phase but never-
theless is commonly regarded as capable to guarantee in near
future similar QoS level as ATM. This paper tries to compare
the efficiency of the mentioned technologies (in case of IP QoS
network the AQUILA network concept [1, 2] is investigated)
for handling traffic generated by LANs with QoS differentia-
tion. This is extremely required since the applications running
in LAN differ in QoS requirements and emitted traffic pro-
files (streaming, elastic). Therefore, a classification process of
outgoing LAN traffic into predefined sub-streams should be
performed at the entry point to WAN network (edge ATM
switch or IP router). Furthermore, particular sub-streams
are submitted to adequate WAN network service, available
in ATM or IP QoS. The paper presents the experimental re-
sults, measured in the test bed, corresponding to QoS level
and QoS differentiation provided by ATM and IP QoS core.
For this purpose, a set of representative applications currently
available to a LAN user was selected demanding from the
core different QoS level. They correspond to streaming ap-
plications like VoIP with QoS objectives represented mainly
by packet delay characteristics and elastic applications con-
trolled by TCP protocol with minimum guaranteed through-
put/goodput as target.
Keywords — traffic control, IP QoS, asynchronous transfer
mode.
1. Introduction
A variety of applications in a LAN environment is now
available. Apart from traditional data computer oriented
applications with data transfer controlled by transmission
control protocol (TCP), like file transfer protocol (FTP),
Telnet, e-mail, world wide web (WWW), a user would
also like to use new Internet applications, like voice
over IP (VoIP), videoconferencing, etc., which are based
on transferring voice or/and video. Let us remark that
data transfer usually tolerates even large packet delays and,
therefore, can be effectively served by e.g. IP best ef-
fort network. On the contrary, for satisfying users, the
voice/video should be transferred with low packet delay
and low packet losses. As a consequence, the packet flow
outgoing from a LAN becomes heterogeneous with respect
to quality of service (QoS) requirements for packet trans-
fer in WAN network. Therefore, a WAN network should
have capability for providing QoS differentiation. This di-
rectly leads to offering by network a number of network ser-
vices (NSs), differing in QoS objectives. For instance, the
file transfer should be handled by a NS aimed at throughput
guarantees, while voice transfer demands a NS guarantee-
ing low packet delay and low packet losses.
Currently, two network technologies offering a set of NSs
are available, that are ATM [7, 8, 9] and IP QoS [3, 4].
The ATM currently offers 6 native ATM NSs, i.e. con-
stant bit rate (CBR), real time variable bit rate (rt-VBR),
non-real time variable bit rate (nrt-VBR), unspecified bit
rate (UBR), available bit rate (ABR), guaranteed frame
rate (GFR). Each of them is designated for handling spec-
ified type of traffic (streaming, elastic) with assumed QoS
objectives (concerning to cell/frame loss and/or delay) and
has its own traffic control rules (traffic contract specification
and policing, admission control). Among them, the UBR
service only does not require traffic flow control mecha-
nisms, since was designed as a best effort service. The rest
of NSs provides QoS guarantees and requires the user to
make some traffic declarations during set-up phase.
Let us remark that ATM NSs were specified with paying
attention rather on types of possible traffic occured in the
network while with loosely focus on the traffic generated
by applications. As a consequence, since applications avail-
able in LANs are IP-oriented, a mapping between IP and
ATM is needed, covering such aspects like QoS and traffic
contract definitions (between packet and ATM cell level),
encapsulation, connection set-up, etc.
An alternative for ATM is the IP QoS concept, which
is regarded as more promising solution for seamless
inter-working with IP-based applications. For the IP QoS
two architectures were proposed: (1) integrated services
(IntServ) [4] and (2) differentiated services (DiffServ) [3].
As IntServ architecture suffers from scalability and can
be implemented in rather small networks, DiffServ ap-
proach suits well for building WAN networks. There-
fore, we focus on DiffServ network concept, more specif-
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ically on its representative implementation provided inside
AQUILA IST European project [1, 2]. For now, four types
of packet flows have been recognised as typically emit-
ted by applications available to a LAN user and requiring
QoS guarantees. They are as follows: (1) streaming con-
stant bit rate (e.g. VoIP), (2) streaming variable bit rate
(e.g. video applications), (3) elastic, produced by greedy
long-live TCP or TCP-like sources (e.g. FTP), and (4)
elastic, non-greedy short-live TCP sources (e.g. WWW).
In this spirit, four QoS NSs have been defined and imple-
mented in AQUILA: premium CBR (PCBR) for traffic (1),
premium VBR (PVBR) for traffic (2), premium multime-
dia (PMM) for traffic (3), and premium mission critical
(PMC) for traffic (4). Each network service is optimised
for specific type of packet flows and has its own traffic con-
trol mechanisms, including admission control. In addition,
standard (STD) service for best effort traffic is also pro-
vided. Obviously, one can find some similarities between
NSs available in ATM and IP QoS (AQUILA). Anyway
they differ in this that ATM NSs operate on cells (53 bytes
packets) while NSs in IP QoS take into account packets
of different length. This gives rather some advantages for
ATM due to better multiplexing and simplest switching.
The investigated network is ATM/IP QoS core intercon-
necting a number of LAN Ethernet networks, as depicted
in Fig. 1. The core offers different NSs, according to used
technology. Let us assume that a LAN user is interested
in getting adequate QoS from the network depending on
the type of application he uses. This can be achieved only
by traffic classification mechanism implemented in the edge
device (edge router or edge ATM switch) and, furthermore,
submitting selected traffic flow to appropriate NS, available
in the core.
Fig. 1. Network architecture.
The paper presents the experimental results, measured in
the test bed, corresponding to QoS level and QoS differenti-
ation provided by ATM/IP QoS core. For this purpose, a set
of representative applications currently available to a LAN
user was selected demanding from the core different QoS.
They correspond to streaming applications like VoIP with
QoS objectives represented mainly by packet delay charac-
teristics and elastic applications controlled by TCP protocol
with minimum guaranteed throughput/goodput as target.
The paper is organised as follows. Characterisation of traf-
fic profiles and QoS demands corresponding to applications
available in LAN is presented in Section 3. Section 2 sum-
marises network services available in ATM and IP QoS and
compare them from the point of view of supported traffic
profiles and QoS objectives. Furthermore, Section 4 in-
troduces us to mapping rules of LAN traffic into network
services with associated mechanisms like traffic classifiers,
shaper and schedulers. The measurement results, showing
effectiveness of ATM and IP QoS network services for han-
dling LAN traffic with QoS differentiation are included in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarises the paper.
2. Types of applications in LAN
Now, a LAN user has access to a variety of applications.
Table 1 shows proposed classification of applications with
respect to QoS requirements [5, 6, 9] and type of emitted
traffic. It assumes four types of applications classes, which
are:
 Class 1: emitting elastic sporadic traffic, e.g. WWW,
e-mails, etc. The applications send short messages
with data flow controlled by TCP. A user is interested
in short transfer time/transaction time.
 Class 2: emitting elastic bulk traffic, e.g. file trans-
fer by FTP. The data transfer lasts relatively long
(say minutes). A user wants to transfer the file in
predictable time interval.
 Class 3: emitting streaming variable bit rate,
e.g. video, VoIP. A user is satisfied with such ap-
plication if no significant packet transfer delay and
packet loses will occur. For instance, in the case of
VoIP similar QoS is expected as in telephone net-
work.
 Class 4: emitting streaming constant bit rate, e.g. vir-
tual leased line (VLL). In this case, a circuit emula-
tion service is required.
Concluding, a user is satisfied with applications available in
LAN if the core network would guarantee adequate quality
of packet transfer. This can be achieved by best effort net-
work but only if it is significantly over-dimensioned. Other
solution is to support by core a number of NSs, each of
them supporting QoS level appropriate for given applica-
tion.
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Table 1
Application classes
QoS requirements
Applications Required bit rate allowed packet allowed packet Application class
[kbit/s] transfer delay loss rate
WWW Up to 100 Medium Low
E-mails Up to 50 High Low
Chatting A few High Low Elastic sporadic traffic
Telnet A few Medium Low
Data base access A few High Low
FTP Up to 1 000 High Low Elastic bulk traffic
Virtual reality environment Up to 128 Medium Low
Video on demand Up 512 Medium Low
Video broadcasting Up to 3 000 Low Low Streaming variable bit rate
Videoconferences:
– video –n*128 Low Medium
– audio –8–32 Low Medium Streaming variable or
IP telefony Up to 64 Low Medium constant bit rate
VLL Up to 2 048 Low Low Streaming constant bit rate
3. Application classes versus network
services in ATM and IP QOS
Summarising, we have from one side a number of applica-
tion classes and from other side a set of NSs supported by
core. Therefore, the problem is mapping applications into
adequate NSs in the way satisfying user. Let us recall, that
the available NSs in ATM and IP QoS are slightly differ-
ent. Table 2 shows the proposed mapping assumed for the
experiments. Although in ATM we have 6 NSs, we had to
limit our interest to 4 NSs only (i.e. CBR, rt-VBR, nrt-VBR
and UBR), since the implemented in a switch ABR as well
as GFR services are not available to applications. Corre-
sponding to AQUILA IP QoS, the tested NSs are premium
CBR, premium VBR, premium multimedia, premium mis-
sion critical and STD.
Table 2
Proposed mapping between application classes and NSs
in ATM and IP QOS
Application ATM network IP QoS network
class service service
Elastic sporadic traffic nrt-VBR Premium mission
critical
Elastic bulk traffic nrt-VBR Premium multi-
media
Streaming variable rt-VBR Premium VBR
bit rate
Streaming constant CBR Premium CBR
bit rate
The proposed mapping takes into account the traffic pro-
files produced by particular application classes jointly with
QoS requirements and capabilities of NSs. For simplifying
experiments with ATM, we have merged both elastic traffic
classes into single one assigned to nrt-VBR service. A jus-
tification for doing it is that the data flow in elastic traffic is
controlled by the same protocol, TCP. The nrt-VBR is de-
signed for guaranteeing assumed cell loss ratio (and in non-
direct way – TCP throughput) while cell transfer delay is
not an objective. In the case of streaming variable/constant
bit rate classes the mapping into adequate NSs is more ob-
vious. The variable/constant bit rate traffic is submitted to
rt-VBR/CBR in ATM or premium VBR/premium CBR in
AQUILA IP QoS. The QoS objectives for the considered
NSs are almost the same as QoS application requirements.
Notice, that the NSs mentioned above require the user to
set-up the connection with appropriate traffic declarations,
corresponding to the single or double leaky/token bucket
parameters. They are the peak bit rate and/or the sustained
bit rate jointly with the maximum burst sizes.
4. Mechanisms for splitting LAN traffic
into particular network services
Handling traffic generated by a LAN with requirements
for QoS differentiation in the core, and as consequence,
splitting it into appropriate NSs, demands implementa-
tion of additional mechanisms in the edge ATM switch
or IP router. These mechanisms should allow us for:
(1) setting up appropriate connection/reservation in a core,
and (2) LAN traffic classification into sub-streams and
mapping them into the established connections inside ade-
quate NSs.
A connection in the core can be set-up by network operator
or on demand by a proxy agent. Classification process
will allow us for selecting the traffic sub-streams and then
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Fig. 2. Scheme for handling LAN traffic.
transferring it by the established connections belonging to
a given NS. Let us remark, that each of the traffic sub-
streams before submitting to the core should be shaped in
accordance to assumed traffic contract. Figure 2 shows the
scheme for traffic handling in the edge device.
First, outgoing LAN traffic is submitted to a classifier for
splitting it in accordance to QoS demands (or equivalently,
according to assigned NS). This process can be done on the
basis of address information included in IP packet header,
TCP/UDP segment header etc. Anyway, this requires im-
plementation of a classification table, which should be up-
dated each time a connection is set-up/released. After the
classification process, the IP packets are switched to the ap-
propriate input queues in the scheduler, governing access
to the core link. Additionally, in case of ATM a packet
segmentation process into ATM cell format is performed.
The queues in scheduler are associated with a given NS.
Usually, in ATM switches we have priority queuing (PQ)
or like-PQ schedulers [9], allowing us for assigning pri-
ority in such a way that the highest is assigned to CBR,
lower to rt-VBR, next to nrt-VBR and the lowest to UBR.
In IP routers the most popular is the weighted fair queuing
(PQ-WFQ) scheduler [1], as assumed e.g. for AQUILA
IP QoS. The PQ-WFQ gives similar prioritization of traffic
submitted inside premium CBR, premium VBR, premium
multimedia, premium mission critical and STD.
5. Measurement results
This section presents comparative measurement results cor-
responding to QoS differentiating of traffic generated be-
tween LAN networks carried by ATM and IP QoS core.
More specifically, we will focus on the quality perceived
by a LAN user using different applications. The applica-
tions selected for the tests are VoIP, e-mails and FTP. The
experiments were carried out in a test bed. The tested net-
work is of the bottleneck type, as depicted in Fig. 3. It
consists of two ATM switches (MARCONI ASX200BX),
connected by direct E1 ATM link, 1.9 Mbit/s. To each
28
A comparison of ATM and IP QoS network capabilities for handling LAN traffic with QoS differentiation
Fig. 3. Tested network.
ATM switch a LAN network is attached, containing IP
router (CISCO 3640) as a gateway for 3 user terminals,
PC1–PC3 (PC4–PC6), and 2 traffic generator/analysers
(InterWatch 95000), IW1–IW2 (IW3–IW4).
Two network scenarios were considered, which are:
1. ATM scenario, where traffic is differentiated in ATM
switch for further submitting to earlier established
connections inside NSs available in ATM, i.e. CBR,
VBR and UBR. In this case, the IP router performs
simple packet forwarding only without applying any
QoS features. It can be treated as completely trans-
parent.
2. IP QoS scenario, where traffic is differentiated in
IP router for further submitting to earlier established
connections inside NSs available in IP QoS, i.e. pre-
mium CBR, premium VBR, premium multimedia,
premium mission critical and STD. In this case, a sin-
gle ATM connection is designated for whole IP traf-
fic. So, the ATM is transparent.
The assumed foreground and background traffic flows car-
ried by bottleneck link are the following:
 Flow #1, produced by UDP controlled application
which requires low packet losses and low packet
transfer delay, like VoIP, is established between traf-
fic generator/analysers IW1 and IW3. This traffic is
of constant bit rate type with 64 kbit/s in the peak. In
this case we assume short IP packets of 53 B (bytes)
size for a fair comparison between ATM and IP QoS.
 Flow #2, produced by “non-greedy” TCP source us-
ing application sending 10 kB messages, like e-mail,
is established between terminals PC1 and PC4.
This traffic is shaped according to contract with
the peak rate PR = 100 kbit/s, the sustained rate
SR = 100 kbit/s, and burst size BS = 10 kB. The
packet size is 1 500 B.
 Flow #3, produced by “greedy” TCP source using
application transferring large files of 5 MB, like FTP.
This flow is established between terminals PC2 and
PC5 and its traffic is also shaped to the same contract
as for flow #2 with packet size also fixed to 1 500 B.
 Flow #4, is exactly the same traffic as flow #3, but
established between terminals PC3 and PC6.
 In addition, the background traffic is submitted into
best effort service, UBR in ATM and STD in IP QoS.
This traffic is of constant bit rate type with the
peak rate 2 Mbit/s, produced between pair of traf-
fic generator/analysers, IW2 and IW4. The presence
of this traffic produces overload in the bottleneck
link 1.9 Mbit/s.
Table 3 summarises the assumed for experiments traf-
fic flows, with specification concerning traffic contact pa-
rameters and affiliation to network services in ATM and
AQUILA IP QoS. The NS affiliation follows the consider-
ation included in Section 3 (see Table 2).
The measured parameters are:
– for TCP-controlled flows #2, #3 and #4, throughput
and goodput,
– and for UDP-controlled flow #1, packet transfer
delay characteristics: max packet transfer delay
(max PTD), peak-to-peak packet delay variation
(PDV) and packet loss rate (PLR).
The reported measured results were collected after 10 in-
dependent measurement intervals each of 5 min. They are
presented with 95% confidence intervals. For each sce-
nario, two experiments were performed, with and without
background traffic.
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Table 3
Types of flows assumed for experiments
Flows Connection Traffic contract Assigned ATM Assigned AQUILA IP
network service QoS network service
Flow #1 IW1–IW3 Constant bit rate with peak rate 64 kbit/s CBR Premium CBR
Flow #2 PC1–PC4 Variable bit rate with peak rate 100 kbit/s, nrt-VBR Premium mission
sustained rate 100 kbit/s, maximum burst critical
size 10 kB
Flow #3 PC2–PC5 Variable bit rate with peak rate 100 kbit/s, nrt-VBR Premium multimedia
sustained rate 100 kbit/s, maximum burst
size 10 kB
Flow #4 PC3–PC6 Variable bit rate with peak rate 100 kbit/s, UBR STD
sustainable rate 100 kbit/s, maximum burst
size 10 kB
Background flow IW2–IW4 Constant bit rate 2 Mbit/s UBR STD
Table 4
Comparative measurement results for ATM versus IP QoS core scenario
Scenario 1: ATM core
flow #1 flow #2 flow #3 flow #4
Test case max PTD PDV PLR throughput goodput throughput goodput throughput goodput
[ms] [ms] [%] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s]
Without 2.12 0.71 0* 73:276:7 69:774:2 79:890:1 77:285:4 77:283:6 74:981:4
background
traffic
With 2.2 0.91 0* 73:176:5 68:973:5 79:789:7 76:884:8 — —
background
traffic
Scenario 2: IP QoS core
flow #1 flow #2 flow #3 flow #4
Test case max PTD PDV PLR throughput goodput throughput goodput throughput goodput
[ms] [ms] [%] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s] [kbit/s]
Without 8.5 8.3 0* 69:372:7 67:269:5 85:688:9 83:486:3 78:481:4 76:679:1
background
traffic
With 8.9 8.4 0* 68:771:8 65:469:0 84:487:5 78:881:3 — —
background
traffic
* No packet losses were observed, — flow starvation was observed.
The measurement results obtained for Scenarios 1 and 2,
and corresponding to foreground flows #14 are collected
in Table 4. One can observe that for both considered sce-
narios the impact of background traffic submitted to best
effort service, UBR in ATM or STD in IP QoS, on traf-
fic handled by other NSs (guaranteeing a given QoS level)
is negligible, as it was expected. Comparing ATM and
IP QoS, we conclude as follows:
 QoS level experienced by flow #1, related with real-
time data, is worst in case of IP QoS than ATM. Let
us recall that in IP QoS scenario, we mix packets
of 53 bytes with packets of 1 500 bytes. Therefore,
the packets from flow #1 could experience relatively
large delay despite that they are handled with the
highest priority. This is due to the packets multiplex-
ing scheme applied in IP routers. So called, residual
packet service time in no-preemptive service disci-
pline, as it is in PQ or PQ-WFQ schedulers, could be
essential in the presence of long size packets gener-
ated by e.g. TCP-controlled applications. This is not
observed in ATM, where cells multiplexing scheme
is applied.
 The values of achieved goodput in case of TCP-
controlled flows #2 and #3 stay on the same level
in IP QoS and ATM scenarios. This result was ex-
pected. The greater values of throughput/goodput
than guaranteed by traffic contract were reached for
flows #2 and #3 in both scenarios. This is due to
non-dropping but marking policy for TCP-controlled
flows and higher priority for nrt-VBR/premium mul-
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timedia service than for UBR/STD in ATM and
IP QoS, respectively. So, one can conclude that two
services nrt-VBR and premium multimedia give sim-
ilar QoS level.
 In both scenarios, the essential starvation of QoS ex-
perienced by flow #4 in observed, when the back-
ground traffic is on. This result was expected since
for the UBR as well as STD services the lowest pri-
ority was assigned and no traffic control mechanisms
are applied.
Concluding, the IP QoS can assure similar QoS level as
achieved by ATM for TCP-controlled traffic. However, for
streaming traffic the CBR service in ATM is more efficient
than premium CBR service in IP QoS.
6. Summary
The paper reports the measurements results correspond-
ing to a comparison between ATM and IP QoS in provid-
ing QoS differentiation for traffic generated by LAN users.
In both cases, this requires implementation of additional
functionality corresponding to traffic classification, shap-
ing, connection set-up and mapping between application
classes and network services at the entry point to the core
network. First observation is that QoS differentiation is
possible to be reached by using both considered technolo-
gies. The different QoS objectives for streaming and elastic
flows can be met by using appropriate ATM or IP QoS net-
work services. More precisely, for streaming flows the low
packet transfer delay and low packet loss rate are guaran-
teed by CBR service in ATM or by premium CBR service
in IP QoS. However, due to packet multiplexing scheme in
the latter case, the observed packet delays are greater. For
elastic flows, the QoS objectives expressed by TCP goodput
are achieved in both cases.
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Paper The Integrated Data
Environment: a new tool for interoperability
and effective data integration for command
and control
Jon Wilkes
Abstract — This paper describes an ongoing effort at NC3A
to provide one integrated database which contains data from
a number of different sources. Initially, these sources are
legacy NATO systems. Later, other systems, including mes-
saging interfaces of a wide variety, and national systems, will
be added. A common data model is used as the lingua franca
between systems. A COTS product has been identified that
creates translator boxes to provide interfaces to and from the
legacy systems.
Keywords — Integrated Data Environment, data interoper-
ability, common data model, data modelling, data translation,
ATCCIS, LC2IEDM, ADatP-32.
1. Introduction
The NATO C3 Agency has responded to customer require-
ments with the Integrated Data Environment (IDE) project,
which has been evolving over the past three years. The
intention of the effort is to provide one integrated database
which contains data from a number of different sources;
in the first place these will be legacy internal NATO sys-
tems. Later, other systems, including messaging interfaces
of a wide variety, and national systems, will be added as
requirements and political concurrence allow. It is foreseen
that IDE will play a significant role in the core capability
package for the Bi-SC AIS. This paper is based heavily on
the work started by the late Martin Krick.
2. The problem
Many of the data exchange problems that have confronted
and bedevilled NATO for the past few decades have arisen
from the fact that early systems were conceived, developed
and implemented as stand-alone, or “stovepipe”, systems by
groups of users and technicians whose requirements hori-
zon extended no further than the immediate needs of the
system on which they were engaged. In the early days,
interoperability of data models was not even considered
relevant.
As time progressed, and the initial desirability of being
able to pass information from one system to another be-
came a more firm requirement, many mechanisms were
devised to address these issues, but always with the caveat
that the software within the in-service systems, seen to be
of such acquisition cost as to be untouchable for interoper-
ability needs, could not be modified to assist in the process
of bringing systems together to provide for any meaningful
direct exchange of data. In addition, because early systems
were so expensive, and therefore made available only to the
smallest possible community of users, and because many
of the more senior users had no ADP facilities at all, or at
most a simple teletype, these early mechanisms were spec-
ified to be able to be used in manual environments, leading
to the definition of a range of messages. Once again, these
message definitions were aimed at encapsulating the spe-
cific needs of the group of users responsible for the defi-
nition of each message; correlation between messages was
not a driving force in the definitions.
3. Previous studies
Many studies were carried out when the nature of the prob-
lem became so large that it could no longer be ignored;
these studies stressed the need for common standards for
data definition, but could not provide low-cost solutions
and their conclusions were therefore ignored. In essence,
they proposed a “data fusion” approach, which is nowadays
seen to be both impractical and unnecessary.
4. The data fusion approach
The principle behind a data fusion approach is to define
a single data model, and implement a single database,
which will encompass the entire set of data currently held in
all existing systems. This approach has some advantages,
but also has many more major drawbacks which make it
an impractical proposition. If we take two or three exist-
ing systems, and create a new database which holds all the
data previously held in the three individual databases in
accordance with a new all-encompassing data model, then
the new database will not be the same as any of the old
ones. Each application suite in the original systems must
therefore be re-written.
It might be possible to create a database interface package
for each system to make the new database appear as the old
database, but that too would be substantial effort (and there
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would be no ab initio guarantee of feasibility) and would
represent an additional load for the original system which
it might well be ill-suited to handle.
A further major, and potentially even more serious, disad-
vantage is that if another legacy system were to be added
to the fusion set, it may impose changes on the data model
which would have a knock-on effect on all current systems
within the fusion set. This would lead to potentially ex-
ponentially soaring costs, and to management problems of
equally soaring complexity. Little wonder that the NATO
committees of the time were not persuaded to follow down
this route!
The perceived advantages and disadvantages of the data
fusion approach can be summarized as:
 single view of all data,
 single physical database from which all applications
can draw data,
whereas the disadvantages are:
 need to agree the (large) data model between 19 na-
tions and all NATO HQs and Agencies,
 immediate impact on all legacy systems which are
required to conform to the new global data model,
 applicable only for a small number of systems (three
or maybe four),
 ongoing management overhead for the fusion schema,
 complexity increases dramatically with the number
of systems,
 process becomes unmanageable with large numbers
of systems.
It should be noted that the advantages are not matched by
any known requirement for all data to be perceived in a sin-
gle view, nor that there should be a capability of provid-
ing a single database implementation which would hold all
data; these advantages represent theoretical technical possi-
bilities only. By contrast, the listed disadvantages are very
real, not least the political problems associated with the first
of those listed. Corresponding agreements in related areas
are not famous for the speed with which such agreements
have been reached nor for the technical clarity of the final
agreements.
5. Other more recent studies
In the last ten years, other initiatives have been taking place
on a lower profile basis, and the fruits of their endeav-
ours are now beginning to become visible in a number
of places; national implementations based on these ini-
tiatives have been put in place and have become sufficiently
mature for reasonable projections to be made. Principal of
these initiatives is the multi-nation ATCCIS1 study, spon-
sored and led by NATO, with active participation at varying
levels by eleven nations.
The major outputs of the ATCCIS study to date have been:
 a wealth of well-documented analysis,
 a fully specified data model for information exchange,
 an ATCCIS replication mechanism (ARM) for selec-
tive transfers of data between two or more ATCCIS-
conformant databases.
The primary achievement of the data modellers is that they
recognised that they were endeavouring to specify a data
model to facilitate the exchange of information rather than
for the design or development of systems; thus the level of
detail of the model is appropriate to information exchange,
and much low-level data, which would typically be found
only in specialist systems, was not included. This separa-
tion of “local” data and “global” data has been one of the
foundation links of the NC3A work on the Integrated Data
Environment.
6. The integration approach
The separation of local and global data leads immediately
to the concept of an IDE which addresses only some of
the totality of data held in all existing (and future) sys-
tems. It also leads directly to the recognition that the IDE
can be established (either as a virtual database or as a real
one) for new purposes, and that the existing systems can
be left with their current databases and database manage-
ment systems – be they rudimentary or advanced – with
the immediate benefit that no changes to those systems are
required. Indeed, it became one of the design objectives of
the IDE work that the IDE concept should be seen to be
non-intrusive from the perspective of any legacy system.
In the integration approach, data are translated from the
native (legacy) environment to the common data model of
the IDE, so that the translated data subsets reside in a single
database or transmission mechanism with one common data
model describing all data. We may think of this common
data model as a “lingua franca”.
The integration approach offers as advantages:
 single view of all global data,
 no impact on legacy systems,
 no requirement to have a single database,
 all future applications can draw global data from ex-
isting databases,
1The common ATCCIS generic hub 4 data model was forwarded to
NATO in 1999. NATO initiated a standardisation process for this data
model, now called the Land C2 Information Exchange Data Model
(LC2IEDM). The respective STANAG 5532 (ADatP-32) has been sub-
mitted as draft and is expected to be agreed in 2001.
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 process remains manageable with large numbers of
systems,
 ongoing management overhead for the integrated
database is much smaller than for the fusion ap-
proach,
 technology is mature and in use in large commercial
organizations,
and as disadvantage:
 as of end 2001, the technology has not been proven
within a NATO operational system (but a demonstra-
tor has been produced, and is clearly scalable to full
operational use).
It may be seen that almost all of the disadvantages of the
fusion approach have been stood on their heads for the IDE
approach. The single view of all data, which was never sup-
ported as an operational requirement, has been scaled down
to become a single view of all global data, for which opera-
tional requirements most certainly exist. The previous high
impact, in terms of both cost and operational implications,
of the fusion approach, has become a zero impact on those
systems. The management problems remain tractable.
On the disadvantage side, the technology has not yet been
tested in a full NATO operational environment, but a four-
system demonstrator has been produced, and the technology
is scalable to encompass a very large number of systems.
In particular, the technology ensures that the management
problems remain at the one-system level, and therefore do
not grow as the number of systems being integrated ex-
pands.
7. Alternative techniques
There are two techniques available to implement the IDE
function, data mediation and data translation. Data media-
tion works by first making associations of the meta-data of
the data sources and the data sink, and then automatically
converting source data to the sink on the basis of these
pre-determined associations. In principle, this is a very
powerful technique; however, at the present time the tech-
nology is still in the research stage, with academic institu-
tions producing small-scale demonstrations. No proposals
for a full-scale demonstration have come to our notice at
this time. The technology is thus considered to be far too
immature to be considered for introduction to NATO at the
present.
By contrast, data translation is a very much more mature
technology which has been in use in commerce for some
time. Most of those applications have been for data ware-
housing applications, but some applications have been for
genuine data integration applications. Where the transla-
tion process is carried out on a one-translator-per-system
basis, there are very few problems about scaling to multi-
ple systems. The scaling problems are mainly associated
with the suitability of the sink data model for the spread
of data types to be found in the source systems; in this re-
spect, the highly generic nature of the ATCCIS data model
is of immense benefit in minimising such risks. Finally, it
must be emphasised that both techniques act on the conver-
sion of data on a one-for-one basis. Data aggregation, data
fusion and other application-level functions are outside the
scope of both technologies.
8. The IDE architecture
Figure 1 gives a very simplified overview of the IDE ar-
chitecture resulting in the use of translation techniques on
a translator-per-system basis. Data from each legacy or
national system is processed by its own local translation
process to the target (sink) data model and added to the
data model of the target system by normal database update
techniques. The translation mechanism is a process, im-
plemented as a software package; although for simplicity
it is shown in this slide as though it were a separate sys-
tem, it could equally well be hosted on the legacy system
if that were to prove to be the preferred option. However,
to emphasise the “No impact” concept, we always show it
as a separate system.
Because the translator process will only translate data about
which it has been provided with appropriate translation data
(which is another form of meta-data), it acts as a sim-
ple form of guard against the accidental translation of data
which is not to be released. However, the translator process
makes no claims to be an approved guard, and additional
security devices would normally be expected to be fitted by
national authorities to protect national systems which may
contain nationally-sensitive data. These would typically be
positioned between the national system and the translator.
Both the initial configuration of the translator, and any sub-
sequent upgrades or changes to a national system will re-
quire detailed analysis of the source system in order to
specify the translation meta-data. For this reason, the con-
figuration of the translators is expected always to be done
by the nation concerned. Figure 1 thus shows the transla-
tors residing in the national management domain, with the
exception of the specification of the output format (ATCCIS
conformant) which is essentially public domain.
9. Work done by NC3A
The preliminary study on data mediation carried out in
1998 showed that the technique held potential for complex
translation situations, and for the tracking of changes to
databases. A simple demonstration system was created,
using the most rudimentary meta-data, which was shown
at JWID-99. Much interest was demonstrated by visitors
at the ability to show data from three different systems
out of a common database in response to a single query,
with the consequential ability to provide for integrated data
solutions.
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Fig. 1. The IDE architecture.
Evaluation of a contractor report made clear that, although
the concepts behind the data mediation technology were
both powerful and useful, the technology was very im-
mature with no commercially available implementations of
a data mediator product, and little prospect of any such
products appearing in the market for some considerable
time. Data mediation may have benefits for special situa-
tions in the future, yet to be assessed and proven.
Fig. 2. The architecture of the translator box.
At the same time, an investigation was made of other prod-
ucts, all of which proved to be data translator systems, and
it was determined that this offered a better approach for
the near term. A contract was let for the development of
a demonstrator using translation technology for display at
JWID 2000. Problems with the suitability of the translation
proposed by the contractor meant that only a very limited
demonstration could be mounted at that time, but a very
good tool has since been developed by the contractor as
a COTS product, which has proven to be very successful
and very flexible. A demonstration held at NC3A in late
November 2000 showed the capabilities of this tool, and
the design gives confidence for its use in many other sit-
uations, including message-oriented environments. A ma-
jor demonstration was held at JWID 2001 and JWID 2002
at SHAPE.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the translator box pro-
duced by the tool.
10. The selected data model for IDE
The selection of the ATCCIS data model, in the form
known as the SHAPE Land Command and Control Infor-
mation Exchange Data Model (LC2IE DM) proved to be
a sound choice. The complex nature of this data model
means that the specifications of the translations are them-
selves more complex, but no instances were found in the
work on the four NATO legacy systems where translations
could not be specified with alacrity and accuracy.
The NATO data administration group reference model is
also based on the ATCCIS model, and is under strict con-
figuration management; the LC2IE DM should similarly be
placed under CM while it is being used as an interim mea-
sure before the full availability of the NATO reference data
model. At the same time, some of the work of the NDAG
could usefully be retro-fitted to the LC2IE DM to make it
into a joint product, a JC2IE DM; the experience of NC3A
and their contractor suggests that the minimal changes for
the interim product would be small and easy to define and
implement. For the November 2000 demonstration men-
tioned above it was necessary to add only four low-level
entities (naval unit, air unit, naval facility and air facility)
and to extend the range of a set of domain values to cover
maritime and air factors. The total work took less than
a couple of days; to repeat this work under full CM con-
trol would take less than one week. The future ATCCIS
generic hub 5 may address the problem.
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11. The tools used for IDE development
Mention has already been made of the shortcomings of
the original analysis tools proposed by the contractor.
These tools were designed for data warehousing applica-
tions where the primary focus of the tools was to analyse
data – often dirty data – for which a data model did not ex-
ist. In the IDE situation, data models existed and were well
documented (although there were some instances where the
semantics of the data were not fully defined). Additionally,
in data warehousing applications, the emphasis on fitting
all source data into a single data model in the destination
system does not apply. It is thus not surprising, with the
benefit of hindsight, that the tools were found to be unsat-
isfactory for the IDE situation.
The analytical process involved in determining the trans-
lations required is both a skilled process and one which
requires time. An analyst familiar with both the source
system and the destination data model can complete several
source tables each day if the source data model is “clean”
and the semantics are fully defined and supported by ex-
emplar data samples. Loose source data models, or a lack
of semantic definition, or a lack of sample data, will slow
the process to a considerable extent. The tool developed by
the contractor provides considerable assistance in convert-
ing the results of the analysis into translation rules; future
versions are expected to provide some additional assistance
to the analysis itself, but cannot fully replace the need for
analysis or the analyst.
12. Conclusions
NATO and the nations still have a plethora of incompatible
data systems which are likely to remain in service for many
years. A fusion approach is not appropriate, and is likely
to prove unmanageable and unaffordable.
The Integrated Data Environment provides a response to
this information management challenge that is both man-
ageable and affordable, and is eminently suitable for an
incremental growth approach.
Commercial off-the-shelf tools are available which support
IDE and thus support coalition interoperability, NATO to
NATO interoperability, NATO to nations interoperability,
and coalition HQ to nations interoperability.
Jon Wilkes is a Senior Ana-
lyst Programmer in the Commu-
nications and Information Sys-
tems Division at the NATO C3
Agency in the Hague. He has
been specialising in the interop-
erability of C2 systems, and the
associated problems of the def-
inition of data, for several years
at the NC3A. More recently he
has been assisting investigations
into ways of implementing mechanisms for providing for in-
teroperability between non-compatible systems which have
led to the development of the IDE concept and the creation
of tools to support the concept.
e-mail: jon.wilkes@nc3a.nato.int
NATO C3 Agency
Postbox 174
2501 CD The Hague, The Netherlands
36
Paper NATO automated information
system co-operative zone technologies
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Abstract — The core components of NATO’s automated
information systems (AIS) include directory services (DS),
e-mail, web services, and military message handling systems
(MMHS) to exchange information with similar capabilities in
NATO’s member nation systems or systems that are under
control of multi-national coalitions. NATO has developed the
concept of information exchange gateways (IEGs) to meet this
requirement. This paper introduces the concept of combin-
ing symmetric co-operative zones (CZs) to form these infor-
mation exchange gateways. A generic framework for the co-
operative zone network and security architecture is introduced
in support of co-operative zone development. It is shown
how a co-operative zone network interface can be integrated
with the NATO general-purpose segment communications sys-
tem (NGCS). Development of the NATO co-operative zones is
based on an evolutionary approach. A baseline co-operative
zone configuration, supporting directory services, e-mail and
web services, has been tested and validated on the allied sys-
tems interoperability testbed (ASIT). This paper reports the
results of the test and validation program. The paper con-
cludes with an overview of planned evolutionary steps for co-
operative zone development. Subjects covered in this overview
are extension of information services, enhancement of security
architecture, and operational deployment (i.e., scalability and
manageability).
Keywords — information exchange, firewall technologies, di-
rectory services, messaging services, web services, INFOSEC.
1. Introduction
NATO’s changing operational environment has caused
a dramatic change in the way commanders use their sup-
porting command control and information systems (CCIS)
to exchange information. As CCIS’s evolve from single-
purpose systems in single-level secure environments to
multi-purpose systems in multiple-level secure environ-
ments, it becomes impossible to build custom interfaces
for each possible permutation of information exchange and
still remain flexible and responsive to change.
Within NATO’s automated information system, the concept
of an information exchange gateway through symmetric co-
operative zones been introduced with the aim to manage
and control all information exchange through a single se-
cure entity with well-defined interfaces.
This paper will focus on the initial architecture of the IEG
concept that has been tested and validated in the NC3A
allied systems interoperability testbed and the evolution of
the concept into operational and more advanced variations.
2. Information exchange gateway
operational view
From the operational point of view an IEG can be charac-
terised by two features:
1) the information services that are passed through the
gateway;
2) the business case identifying the difference in secu-
rity level that is bridged by the IEG.
Information services can be end-user related services, such
as mail and web, but also be infrastructure or management
services, such as domain name service (DNS) and simple
network management protocol (SNMP).
Within the scope of the IEG program of work [1] three
configuration cases have been identified so far:
 Case A. NATO-SECRET to NATO-SECRET en-
claves that reside in environments under control of
NATO or NATO member nations. There are no inter-
connections to national CCIS networks. The Case A
gateway is sometimes classified as a NATO point of
presence (POP). From the POP boundary, the nation
has the responsibility to deliver the information ser-
vice to the user.
 Case B. NATO-SECRET to NATO National Secret-
HIGH systems that reside in environments under con-
trol of NATO member nations.
 Case C. NATO-SECRET to coalition secret systems
that fall under the responsibility of a Combined Joint
Task Force in which NATO is in the lead.
3. Information exchange gateway
architecture
The basic conceptual framework of the information ex-
change gateway through symmetric co-operative zones is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Information exchange between a sender and receiver, both
residing in separate local CCIS networks, will always take
place via the sender’s own CZ and through a symmetric CZ
under control of the receiver. No direct traffic is allowed
between two local CCIS networks other than that relayed
through the source and destination CZs.
The example in Fig. 1 shows this information flow from
a nation-X CCIS supporting service A to its counterpart in
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Fig. 1. Information exchange gateway through co-operative zones.
the NATO local CCIS (dashed information flow labelled 0).
This information flow that consists of 3 logical connections
(labelled 1 up to 3 in Fig. 1):
1) nation-X CCIS service A to nation-X CZ proxy ser-
vice A;
2) nation-X CZ proxy service A to NATO CZ proxy
service A;
3) NATO CZ proxy service A to NATO CCIS service A.
The information services that will be shared through a CZ
are to be established on a trustworthy network and se-
curity architecture. One of the basic principles of trust-
worthy computing is to work with well-defined restricted
interfaces. Another important principle is to avoid un-
necessary complexity (keep it simple). Therefore, the
architecture that has been adopted for the information
exchange gateway employs symmetric co-operative zone
modules (CZMs) at both ends of the IEG. This symmetry
requirement holds the number of CZM interfaces to a min-
imum.
In addition to symmetry the following design principles are
applied for the further development of the CZMs:
 Minimise the number of protocols that run across
the IEG.
 Minimise the volume of network traffic overhead that
is generated by a certain service.
 Standardise on common protocols.
 Avoid services or features that carry great risk with
respect to security vulnerabilities.
The following categories of IEG architecture will be ex-
plained in more detail:
1) security architecture;
2) network architecture;
3) backbone and management services architecture.
3.1. Security architecture
The CZ security architecture most closely resembles
a “screened subnet firewall configuration” based on a bas-
tion host that provides authentication and proxy ser-
vices [2]. Figure 2 illustrates the security elements com-
prised by a CZM. These are:
 A boundary protection device (firewall) that provides
the source environment (i.e., local CCIS) with the
protection required under NATO’s “self-protecting
node” guidance [3].
 A second boundary protection device (filtering
router) that manages and secures network paths, pro-
tocols and ports to other co-operative zones between
service peers at the fixed IP-to-IP-number level.
 An intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect at-
tempted exploitation of (emerging) security flaws that
occur in the CZM component systems.
The bastion host capability (providing both authentication
and proxy services) has been implemented in the following
fashion:
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Fig. 2. Co-operative zone INFOSEC components.
 CZ proxy servers to relay traffic from/to the
source/target servers in the local CCIS domain
(through the BPD/firewall).
 Proxy authentication by the BPD or as part of the
local CCIS system.
The chosen approach provides a high level of security, be-
cause there are three levels of defence to thwart intruders:
 The filtering router only advertises (limited) IP-
numbers of the CZ subnet – the local CCIS network
is invisible from the outside.
 The firewall only advertises and supports connection
from local CCIS concentrator servers and counterpart
proxy servers in the CZ.
 Potential emerging vulnerabilities are pro-actively de-
tected by the IDS.
The user information flow (Fig. 2) is redirected through
these three levels by seven consecutive connection steps.
3.2. Network architecture
For Cases A and B, where CZs of NATO or NATO mem-
ber nation controlled entities are involved, the NATO poli-
cies for interconnection [4] prescribe the application of net-
work encryption facilities to establish a trusted intercon-
nected CZ WAN.
NATO will establish a “backbone” infrastructure of NATO
CZs to which other, NATO national CZs, can connect. This
backbone infrastructure will be based on the draft NATO
general purpose communication segment architecture [5].
NATO national sites get connected to the NATO network
through the nearest NGCS access router. The CZs will
share one common (private) IP-space.
Fig. 3. Co-operative zone module NGCS interface.
Co-operative zones get integrated into the NGSC network
through IP-encryption, using the NATO IP-crypto equip-
ment (NICE) [6] and hooking into the nearest NGCS access
router. Figure 3 shows which network and security devices
a CZ uses to connect to the physical bearer network.
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Fig. 4. Information exchange gateway ASIT system diagram.
The configuration comprises the following devices:
– secure access (Fig. 3 – dashed line) router, used for
tunnelling through the IP-network;
– the NATO IP-crypto device (NICE);
– an unclassified access router (UAR);
– backbone router (BR);
– bandwidth management equipment (BME).
3.3. Backbone and management services architecture
In addition to the core IEG user services, backbone and
management services are needed to maintain the poten-
tially large network of CZM nodes. Examples of backbone
services are:
– time services (based on NTP);
– distributed replication services for some of the in-
volved user services and supporting services (e.g. di-
rectory services, DNS, etc.);
– redundant network and server backbone infrastruc-
ture.
Examples of management services are:
– naming and addressing (performed by the NATO
naming and addressing authority);
– network, systems, and services monitoring (e.g.
through SNMP);
– software and hardware configuration management
and distribution.
4. Baseline configuration
An IEG baseline configuration has been established in
the ASIT, to test and validate the concept of an IEG
through symmetric CZs. The baseline configuration sim-
ulates a Case A IEG providing the following information
services:
– e-mail based on X-400;
– web supporting HTTP and HTTPS;
– directory services based on LDAP version 3.
The directory service basically supports the e-mail address
book capability, and directory replication is supported.
A system diagram depicting the server, network and se-
curity components of the ASIT configuration is shown
in Fig. 4. The following IEG network domains were
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implemented based on the IP-subnet distribution as shown
in Table 1.
Tables 2–4 specify the ASIT components in further detail1.
The remainder of this chapter describes the detailed con-
figurations and lessons learned of the mail, web, directory,
and security services.
Table 1
ASIT IP-subnets
Subnet Specification
A NATO CCIS LAN
B NATO CZ
C
Routing domain in between the back-to-back
filtering routers
D Nation-X CZ
E Nation-X CCIS LAN
Table 2
NATO/nation-X CCIS components
NATO and nation-X
CCIS components
Product specification
Web server Microsoft IIS 5.0
Web proxy server MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server (MTA) Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server MS Exchange 5.5 GAL
Meta-directory Microsoft MMS 2.2
Table 3
Nation-X CZ components
Nation-X CZ Specification
Filtering router CISCO 2500
IDS RealSecure
Firewall Checkpoint Firewall-1
Web proxy MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server (MTA) Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server MS Exchange 5.5 GAL
Meta-directory Microsoft MMS 2.2
Table 4
NATO CZ components
NATO CZ Specification
Filtering router CISCO 2500
IDS RealSecure
Firewall Checkpoint Firewall-1
Web proxy MS ISA 2000 server
Mail server Microsoft Exchange 5.5
Directory server DCL (X500)
Directory replication hub DCL (X500)
1The Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP2 OS was used un-
less it is specified otherwise.
4.1. E-mail
The e-mail service is based on X-400. Each CZM con-
tains an X-400 mail transfer agent (MTA), based on the
MS Exchange 5.5 product [7], with two X-400 connectors
connecting to the local CCIS MTA and a peer co-operative
zone MTA. Figure 5 shows the mail flow and Exchange 5.5
site addressing as have been used in the testbed.
Fig. 5. Testbed e-mail configuration.
Table 5 gives an example specification of the X-400 con-
nector labelled as “NATO-TO-IEG-NATO”.
Table 5
Example X-400 connector specification
Feature Specification
Routing X400: C=OO;a= ;p=NATO-IEG;o=
IEG-NATO;X400: C=CC(nation-X);
a=;p=nation-X-CCIS;o=*
MTA 1988 normal mode
conformance
X400 link options BP-15 (in addition to BP-14)
Two way alternate
Allow exchange format
X400 body part IA5
Use the GDI from site addressing
Configuration of the e-mail infrastructure was straightfor-
ward. One issue that had to be resolved was related to
passing X-400 through the firewall that is configured with
NAT. X-400 connectors at both ends need to be configured
as if they are communicating on a fixed IP-path. Therefore,
an additional firewall rule had to be added enforcing adver-
tisement of a fixed IP-number for incoming X-400 traffic.
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Fig. 6. Directory replication.
4.2. Directory services
The testbed’s directory services closely follow the NATO
directory services interoperability model [8]. This model
is based on three layers of directory services:
1) custom system and application directories (lowest
layer);
2) enterprise directory, supporting all enterprise com-
mon directory information (middle layer);
3) border directories, created for sharing certain direc-
tory information with other organisations (top layer).
NATO and the nations have agreed to use a schema based
on ACP 133 [9] in the alliance domain. Also, the current
guidance is to use X.500 replication (DISP) to ensure that
all the DS data published into the alliance domain is avail-
able on every participating border directory service agent
(DSA). As every nation is responsible for its own border
DSA, it is very likely that they will be based on many
different products, and multi-vendor X.500 DISP interop-
erability is not guaranteed. Some nations may therefore
need to employ other replication techniques, e.g. based on
meta-directory technology, to ensure that their border DSA
is as well populated as those that are able to participate in
the automatic X.500 replication.
The filtering and synchronisation processes that control the
flow between the application and enterprise layers, and be-
tween the enterprise and border layers in the DS archi-
tecture, are commonly implemented using meta-directory
technology (based on LDAP version 3).
The following mapping of DS interoperability model enti-
ties has been implemented in the testbed:
 The NATO (enterprise) and NATO nation enterprise
directory are represented as the Exchange 5.5 global
address list (GAL), which is an LDAP version 3 read-
able/writable directory.
 The NATO border directory is based on X-500 (DCL
product) [10] and uses the agreed ACP133 schema.
 The nation-X border directory is based on an Ex-
change 5.5 GAL as a low-cost, easy to implement
LDAP readable/writable directory.
 An allied replication hub directory has been imple-
mented to facilitate directory synchronisation of bor-
der directories using the directory information shad-
owing protocol (DISP). This directory provides sub-
trees for NATO and NATO nations in which only
the owner of the information has write access and all
others have read access.
 Meta-directory technology has been implemented to
facilitate directory synchronisation.
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The test exercise that was executed on the testbed was to
synchronise e-mail recipients information in support of an
“allied recipients” subcontainer of the exchange e-mail ad-
dress list. Figure 6 shows the directory synchronisation
flow.
Information publication was achieved through:
 Publishing releasable mail recipient information from
the enterprise directory layer to the border directory
layer.
 Shadowing the published border directory mail recip-
ient information (subtree) to the counterpart subtree
in the hub directory.
Information download was achieved through:
 Shadowing the mail recipient information in the non-
owned subtrees of the NATO replication hub direc-
tory the border directory into the equivalent subtrees
in the border directory.
 Synchronising the mail recipient information in the
non-owned subtrees in the border directory with the
“allied recipients” container of the Exchange 5.5 (en-
terprise) directory.
The two protocols used for directory synchronisation were:
 DISP to synchronise the NATO replication hub
X-500 directory information with the NATO border
X-500 directory.
 LDAP version 3 to synchronise local CCIS direc-
tories with the border directories and to synchro-
nise the nation-X border directory with the NATO
hub X-500 directory. For configuration management
and control of LDAP based directory synchronisa-
tion the Microsoft meta-directory services tool was
used [11] by applying the Exchange 5.5 and generic
LDAP management agents.
An important lesson learned from the directory synchro-
nisation work is that the directory attribute-flow in be-
tween diverse systems (MMS processing rules, X-500 and
exchange GAL directory schema) requires a rigorous map-
ping scheme of attributes and attribute translation rules.
4.3. Web services
Since Case A users require seamless web services, there
must be a collaborating chain of local CCIS and CZ web
proxy services for HTTP(S) traffic. The web proxy servers
are responsible for routing of HTTP-traffic from/to browser
to/from the target web server, through the CZ web proxy
servers. No direct web server to browser traffic is al-
lowed.
The web proxy server chain (Fig. 7) handles HTTP-requests
for a “foreign” web page in the following way:
 An HTTP-request for a NATO CCIS web page hosted
by a NATO CCIS web server is made by a na-
tion-X user. It is redirected through the nation-X
proxy server to the nation-X CZ proxy server and
forwarded to the NATO CZ proxy server.
 The NATO CZ proxy server routes the request to the
downstream NATO CCIS proxy server that will then
finally connect to the target web server.
 The NATO CCIS target web server response is re-
turned through the NATO web proxy server and the
NATO CZ web proxy server to the nation-X CZ web
proxy.
 The nation-X CZ proxy routes the response back to
nation-X CCIS web proxy. This proxy will then
finally route the response to the requesting web
browser.
In the testbed experiment the Microsoft Internet accelera-
tion server (ISA) [12] was used to implement the required
web proxy server capability.
Fig. 7. Allied systems interoperability testbed web proxy chain.
Since the implementation is fully symmetric we will only
give the configuration settings of the NATO local CCIS
proxy server and the NATO CZ proxy server in Tables 6
and 7, respectively.
The configuration of the web proxy services (routes) was
straightforward in the test configuration. It is expected that
the live installation will need to be tuned (using caching,
etc.) to establish acceptable response times to the end-
user. It need to be noted that web browsing based on IP-ad-
dresses in “external” domains is not supported through this
method.
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Table 6
NATO local CCIS proxy settings
Attribute Setting
Client sets  NATO clients: subnet A
 NATO CZ clients: IP-address
NATO CZ web proxy server
Destination  NATO sites: *.nato.int
sets  Nation-X sites: *.nation-x
Protocol  Access allowed to HTTP(S) for
rules NATO clients and NATO CZ clients
 Access denied for FTP/Gopher for
both NATO and NATO CZ clients
Site and  Access to nation-X sites allowed
content rules to NATO clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
NATO CZ clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
NATO clients
Routing for  Requests to NATO sites retrieved
web browser directly from specified destination
applications  Requests to nation-X sites are routed
to a specified upstream server:
IP-address NATO CZ web proxy
server port: 8080
Table 7
NATO CZ proxy server settings
Attribute Setting
Client sets  NATO clients: NAT IP-address ad-
vertised by NATO CZ firewall (B.x)
 Nation-X CZ clients: IP-address
nation-X CZ web proxy server
Destination  NATO sites: *.nato.int
sets  Nation-X sites: *.nation-x
Protocol  Access allowed to HTTP(S) for
rules NATO clients and nation-X CZ
clients
 Access denied for FTP/Gopher for
both NATO clients and nation-X CZ
clients
Site and  Access to nation-X sites allowed
content rules to NATO clients
 Access to NATO sites allowed to
nation-X CZ clients
Routing for  Requests to NATO sites are routed
web browser to a specified upstream server:
applications NATO IP-address advertised by
NATO CZ firewall (B.x)
 Requests to nation-X sites are routed
to a specified upstream server:
IP-address nation-X CZ web proxy
server
4.4. Security and network services
In order to achieve the required level of security for
Case A the following features have been implemented on
the testbed:
 A firewall, based on an EAL-4 assurance level [13]
product, checkpoint firewall-1 [14], installed on a C2
configured Windows NT-4 (service pack 3) plat-
form [15]. In the testbed NAT has been implemented
to hide the local CCIS system address space. As
a measure of verification both NATO and nation-X
IP subnets were assigned the same IP address range
with identical IP addresses for the mail, directory,
and web servers on either side of the firewall. The
firewall rules support X-400, LDAP, HTTP, HTTPS.
 The filtering router has been setup to only allow
connections between peer servers in the NATO and
nation-X co-operative zone (e.g. MTA to MTA,
proxy server to proxy server, directory server to hub
directory).
 The intrusion detection system based on the realse-
cure product [16] has been connected to the CZ LAN
as a stealth (receive-only) probe and console. The
IDS monitors the traffic across the CZ in both direc-
tions, detecting incidents of known exploit attempts
against the CZ proxy servers or the security compo-
nents.
One important note to be made is that DNS is not required
as a supporting service to resolve names to IP-numbers, be-
cause all routing is done based on fixed configured “routes”
on an IP-to-IP basis through proxy routes, X-400 connec-
tors, and DISP/LDAP connections.
5. Co-operative zone technologies
evolution
The Information exchange gateway configuration that was
tested and verified in the ASIT is considered to be a base
line configuration. This baseline configuration will evolve
in the following technology areas:
 Addition of AIS functional services.
 Adding security services by hardening security and
developing Case B and Case C gateways.
 Development of backbone services.
The addition of functional services is a requirement that
is very much dependent on further developments in the
following areas:
 Migration of present custom interfaces from NATO
to NATO nations and coalitions.
 Deployment of new allied systems.
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 Operational requirements that lead to a requirement
for additional functional services. For example, a new
NATO system that will be deployed in the next
couple of years is the NATO messaging services
(NMS) system. The NMS will introduce the re-
quirement for additional services to pass through the
CZ to support a military message handling system
(MMHS) [17] and, potentially, a NATO public key
infrastructure (NPKI) [18].
Other services that are identified to be developed as a part
of the Bi-SC AIS core capabilities [1] might also be
candidates to get deployed as gateway services. Examples
are:
– conferencing services (based on H323);
– real-time data streams (RMP, RAP);
– distributed database (SQL);
– middleware and XML web services communications
features.
The two driving forces behind the further development of
security services are:
1) optimisation of security features of the Case A base-
line configuration;
2) additional security features required for Case B and
Case C.
Optimisation of Case A security services includes:
 Further development of intrusion detection patterns
and matching intrusion detection information at
a central level.
 Configuring the server installation templates up to
the C2 level [13].
 Shielding of the CZ IP-space to the local CIS network
IP-space. For this it is considered to implement either
NAT from CZ to local CIS or to run an IP-proxy
service in front of the BPD.
 Prescribe usage of security tools such as security
templates, virus checkers, vulnerability scanners for
configuration and operation of information services.
 Develop a concept for centralised monitoring of in-
trusion detection consoles.
For Case B it is envisioned that the security services will
not differ from Case A with the exception of the imple-
mentation of web publishing rules. The reverse proxy ser-
vice will be restricted based on access controls. A re-
quest will be authenticated to the BPD/firewall that pro-
vides access to the local CCIS web services by imperson-
ating a guest account in the local CCIS domain, based on
the authenticated service, group, or individual user account
level. The establishment of authentication services may be
supported through the implementation of a NATO public
key infrastructure [18] and the establishment of an allied
PKI interoperability profile. Initially, though, it is antic-
ipated that identification and authentication of authorized
users will be left as a locally-selected and operated func-
tion, with support from the NATO/national AIS staff as
required.
For Case C, the picture for security features looks very
different from the Case A security features. Case C is
only in a very early stage of concept development and it is
anticipated that the services supported across the CZ will
begin with 2-way messaging and directory services. Ad-
ditionally, (one-way) coalition-to-NATO file transfer, much
like the current interfaces between NATO and SFOR/KFOR
will need to be implemented. Security options for bidirec-
tional file transfer and web services are currently under
study.
Scalability and availability are very important features that
go together if the amount of interconnected CZs increases.
The following solutions are considered to master scalability
and availability aspects by establishing an IEG backbone
infrastructure:
– redundant CZs per NATO nation;
– multiple NATO CZs (covering regions and are in hot-
standby for backup);
– high availability requirements for the underlying net-
work layer (NGCS QOS);
– redundant paths (creating secondary connectors) for
MTA’s;
– distribution of NATO hub directory.
6. Conclusion
A baseline configuration for an information exchange gate-
way has successfully been tested and validated in the al-
lied systems interoperability testbed. Lessons learned are
taken for the further evolution and the operational deploy-
ment of the information exchange concept. The NATO C3
Agency is looking forward to a very busy period with the
NATO nations to test and implement the information ex-
change gateway concept and contribute to allied systems
interoperability.
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Paper Military route planning
in battlefield simulation:
effectiveness problems
and potential solutions
Zbigniew Tarapata
Abstract — Path searching is challenging problem in many
domains such as simulation war games, robotics, military mis-
sion planning, computer generated forces (CGF), etc. Effec-
tiveness problems in military route planning are related both
with terrain modelling and path planning algorithms. These
problems may be considered from the point of view of many
criterions. It seems that two criterions are the most impor-
tant: quality of terrain reflection in the terrain model and
computational complexity of the on(off)-line path planning al-
gorithm. The paper deals with two above indicated problems
of route planning effectiveness. Comparison of approaches
used in route planning is presented. The hybrid, terrain
merging-based and partial path planning, approach for route
planning in dynamically changed environment during simu-
lation is described. It significantly increase effectiveness of
route planning process. The computational complexity of the
method is given and some discussion for using the method in
the battlefield simulation is conducted. In order to estimate
how many times faster we can compute problem for finding
shortest path in network with n big squares (b-nodes) with
relation to problem for finding shortest path in the network
with V small squares (s-nodes) acceleration function is defined
and optimized.
Keywords — battlefield simulation, route planning, shortest
paths, effectiveness problems, computational complexity.
1. Introduction
For many years in military applications a simulated battle-
field is used for training military personnel. There are at
least three ways to provide the simulated opponent:
– two groups of trainees in simulators may oppose
each other (often used);
– human instructors who are trained to behave in
a way that mimics the desired enemy doctrine (sel-
dom used);
– computer system that generates and controls multi-
ple simulation entities using software and possibly
a human operator.
The last approach is known as a semi-automated force
(SAF or SAFOR) or a computer generated force (CGF).
CGF is used in military distributed interactive simula-
tion (DIS) systems to control large numbers of autonomous
battlefield entities using computer equipment and software
rather than humans in simulators.
The advantages of CGF are well-known [17]:
1) they lower the cost of a DIS system by reducing the
number of standard simulators that must be purchased
and maintained;
2) CGF can be programmed, in theory, to behave ac-
cording to the tactical doctrine of any desired op-
posing force, and so eliminate the need to train and
retrain human operators to behave like the current
enemy;
3) CGF can be easier to control by a single person than
an opposing force made up of many human operators
and it may give the training instructor greater control
over the training experience.
As an inseparable part of CGF, modules for route plan-
ning based on the real-terrain models are used. For exam-
ple in modular semi-automated forces (ModSAF) in module
“SAFsim”, which simulates the entities, units, and envi-
ronmental processes the route planning component is lo-
cated [14]. Moreover, automated route planning will be
a key element of almost any automated terrain analysis
system that is a component of a military command and
control system. In the work [1] authors describe a com-
bined on-road/off-road planning system that was closely
integrated with a geographic information system and a sim-
ulation system. Routes can be planned for either single
columns or multiple columns. For multiple columns, the
planner keeps track of the temporal location of each col-
umn and insures they will not occupy the same space at the
same time. In the same paper the hierarchic route planner
as integrate part of predictive intelligence military tactical
analysis system (PIMTAS) is discussed. In the paper [8]
authors presented an on-going efforts to develop a proto-
type for ground operations planning, the route planning
uncertainty manager (RPLUM) tool kit. They are apply-
ing uncertainty management to terrain analysis and route
planning since this activity supports the commander’s
scheme of maneuver from the highest command level down
to the level of each combat vehicle in every subordinate
command. They extend the PIMTAS [1] route planning
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software to accomodate results of reasoning about mul-
tiple categories of uncertainty. Authors of the paper [3]
presented route planning in the close combat tactical
trainer (CCTT).
Kreitzberg [11] has developed the tactical movement ana-
lyzer (TMA). The system uses a combination of digitized
maps, satellite images, vehicle type and weather data to
compute the traversal time across a grid cell. TMA can
compute optimum paths that combine both on-road and off-
road mobility, and with weather conditions used to modify
the grid cost factors. The smallest grid size used is ap-
proximately 0.5 km. Author uses the concept of a signal
propagating from the starting point and uses the traversal
time at each cell in the array to determine the time at which
the signal arrives at neighboring cells. Other researchers
have chosen to decompose the map into regions that are
defined by having a constant traversability across the re-
gion [1, 9, 16, 19, 20, 27]. The advantage of this approach
is that the number of regions will, in general, be far fewer
than the number of grid cells. The disadvantages include
difficulty in defining the center of the region and the com-
putation difficulties in determining the optimum paths be-
tween two adjacent cells. The optimum region-to-region
path can be obtained by using either Dijkstra’s continu-
ous algorithm (DCA) developed by Mitchell [15]. In many
cases, a multiresolution simulation modelling is used to
simplify complex battlefield processes [4, 6, 16, 17].
As integrated part of route planning modules the terrain
database-based model is being used. Terrain data can be
as simple as an array of elevations (which provides only
a limited means to estimate mobility) or as a complex
as an elevation array combined with digital map overlays
of slope, soil, vegetation, drainage, obstacles, transporta-
tion (roads, etc.) and the quantity of recent weather. For
example in [1] authors describe heterogeneous reasoning
and mediator environment system (HERMES) will allow
the answering of queries that require the interrogation of
multiple databases in order to determine the start and des-
tination parameters for the route planner.
There are a few approaches in which the map (represent-
ing a terrain area) is decomposed into a graph [1, 9,
19, 20]. All of them first convert the map into regions
of go (open) and no-go (closed). The no-go areas may be
considered as obstacles and are represented as polygons.
A few ways for consider the map can be used, for example:
visibility diagram, Voronoi diagram, straight-line dual of
the Voronoi diagram, edge-dual graph, line-thinned skele-
ton, regular grid of squares, grid of homogeneous squares
coded in quadtree system, etc.
Effectiveness problems in military route planning are re-
lated both with terrain modelling and path planning algo-
rithms. These problems may be considered from the point
of view of many criterions. It seems that two criterions
are the most important: quality of terrain reflection in the
terrain model (visibility diagram, Voronoi diagram, regular
grid of terrain squares, etc.) and computational complex-
ity of the on(off)-line path planning algorithm. The paper
deals with above indicated problems of route planning ef-
fectiveness.
In the next section we will discuss in details route planning
approaches.
2. Comparison approaches used
in route planning
It was said in the previous section that we will deal with
effectiveness of two problems of battlefield simulation:
– terrain reflection in the terrain model used in battle-
field simulation;
– military route planning using one of terrain models.
If terrain models are concerned a few ways for consider-
ing the map were listed in the previous section: Voronoi
diagram, straight-line dual of the Voronoi diagram (the
Delaunay triangulation), visibility diagram, edge-dual
graph, line-thinned skeleton, regular grid of squares, grid
of homogeneous squares coded in quadtree system.
The polygonal representations of the terrain are often cre-
ated in database generated systems (DBGS) through a com-
bination of automated and manual processes [19]. It is
important to say that these processes are computationally
complicated but are conducted before simulation (during
preparation process). Typically, an initial polygonal repre-
sentation is created from the digital terrain elevation data
through the use of an automated triangulation algorithm,
resulting in what is commonly referred to as a triangulated
irregular network (TIN). A commonly used triangulation
algorithm is the Delaunay triangulation. Definition of the
Delaunay triangulation may be done via its direct relation
to the Voronoi diagram of a set, S, of N 2D points: the
straight-line dual of the Voronoi diagram is a triangulation
of S.
The Voronoi diagram is the solution to the following prob-
lem: given a set S of N points in the plane, for each
point pi in S what is the locus of points (x; y) in the plane
that are closer to pi than to any other point of S?
The straight-line dual is defined as the graph embedded
in the plane obtained by adding a straight-line segment be-
tween each pair of points of S whose Voronoi polygons
share an edge. Figure 1 depicts an irregularly spaced set
of points S, its Voronoi diagram, and its straight-line dual
(i.e. its Delaunay triangulation).
The edge-dual graph is essentially an adjacency list rep-
resenting the spatial structure of the map. To create this
graph, we assign a node to the midpoint of each map edge
which does not bound an obstacle (or the border). Special
nodes are assigned to the start and goal points. In each
non-obstacle region, we add arcs to connect all nodes at
the midpoints of the edges which bound the same region.
The fact that all regions are convex guarantees that all such
arcs cannot intersect obstacles or other regions. Example
of the edge-dual graph is presented in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Voronoi diagram and its Delaunay triangulation [19]:
(a) a set S of N points in the plane; (b) the Voronoi diagram of S;
(c) the straight-line dual of the Voronoi diagram (the Delaunay
triangulation).
Fig. 2. Edge-dual graph. Obstacles are represented by filled
polygons.
The visibility graph, is a graph whose nodes are the ver-
tices of terrain polygons and whose edges joint pairs of
nodes for which the corresponding segment lies inside poly-
gon. An example is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Visibility graph [15]. There is marked shortest geometric
path from source node s to destination t. Obstacles are represented
by filled polygons.
The regular grid of squares divides terrain space on the
squares with the same size and each square is treated as
having homogeneity from the point of view of terrain char-
acteristics. An example of this approach will present in the
next sections (see Fig. 6 and Fig. 7).
The grid of homogeneous squares coded in quadtree
system divides terrain space on the squares with hetero-
geneous size. The size of square results from its homo-
geneity according to terrain characteristics. Example of
this approach was presented, e.g. in [29].
If paths planning approaches used in battlefield simulation
are concerned, there are four main approaches [10]: free
space analysis, vertex graph analysis, potential fields, grid
based algorithms.
In the free space approach, only the space not blocked
and occupied by obstacles is represented. For example,
representing the center of movement corridors with Voronoi
diagrams [19] is a free space approach (see Fig. 1).
Advantage of Voronoi diagrams is that they have efficient
representation.
Disadvantages of Voronoi diagrams:
– they tend to generate unrealistic paths (paths derived
from Voronoi diagrams follow the center of corridors
while paths derived from visibility graphs clip the
edges of obstacles);
– the width and trafficability of corridors are typically
ignored;
– distance is generally the only factor considered in
choosing the optimal path.
In the vertex graph approach, only the endpoints (ver-
tices) of possible path segments are represented [15].
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Advantages:
– this approach is suitable for spaces that have sufficient
obstacles to determine the endpoints.
Disadvantages:
– determining the vertices in “open” terrain is difficult;
– trafficability over the path segment is not represented;
– factors other than distance cannot be included in eval-
uating possible routes.
In the potential field approach, the goal (destination) is
represented as an “attractor”, obstacles are represented by
“repellors”, and the vehicles are pulled toward the goal
while being repelled from the obstacles.
Disadvantages:
– the vehicles can be attracted into box canyons from
which they cannot escape;
– some elements of the terrain may simultaneously at-
tract and repel.
In the regular grid approach, a grid overlays the terrain,
terrain features are abstracted into the grid, and the grid
rather than the terrain is analyzed.
Advantages:
– simplification of the analysis.
Disadvantages:
– “jagged” paths are produced because movement out
of a grid cell is restricted to four (or eight) direc-
tions corresponding to the four (or eight) neighboring
cells;
– granularity (size of the grid cells) determines the
accuracy of terrain representation.
A many of route planners in the literature are based on
the Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm, A algorithm [7],
geometric path planning algorithms [15] or its vari-
ants [12, 13, 18, 26, 31, 32]. For example, A has been used
in a number of computer generated forces systems as the
basis of their planning component, to plan road routes [3],
avoid moving obstacles [10], avoid static obstacles [18]
and to plan concealed routes [14]. Very extensive discus-
sion related to geometric shortest path planning algorithms
was presented by Mitchell in [15] (references consist of
393 papers and handbooks). Geometric shortest paths prob-
lem is defined as follows: given a collection of obstacles,
find an Euclidean shortest obstacle-avoiding path between
two given points. Mitchell considers following problems:
– geodesic paths in a simple polygon;
– paths in a polygonal domain (searching the visibility
graph, continuous Dijkstra algorithm);
– shortest paths in other metrics (Lp metric, link dis-
tance, weighted region metric, minimum-time paths,
curvature-constrained shortest paths, optimal motion
of non-point robots, multiple criteria optimal paths,
sailor’s problem, maximum concealment path prob-
lem, minimum total turn problem, fuel-consuming
problem, shortest paths problem in an arrangement);
– on-line algorithms and navigation without map;
– shortest paths in higher dimensions.
3. Effectiveness problems
in route planning
We focus one’s attention on path planning algorithms and
its effectiveness. Path planning algorithms used in battle-
field simulation can be off-line or on-line. Off-line path
planning algorithms like A* or Dijkstra’s algorithm (listed
in the previous section) find the whole solution before start-
ing execution (simulation). They plan paths in advance and
usually find optimal solutions. Their efficiency is not con-
sidered to be crucial and the moved object just follows the
generated path. Although this is a good solution for a static
environment, it is rather infeasible for dynamic environ-
ments, because if the environment or the cost functions
are changed, the remaining path may need to be replanned,
which is not efficient for real-time applications (e.g. real-
time simulation). Let’s recall that standard Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm has time complexity O(V 2), where V denotes number
of nodes in the graph. This complexity may be improved
(if the graph is thin) implementing priority queue as bi-
nary heap, obtaining O(E  lg V ), or implementing priority
queue as Fibonacci heap, obtaining O(E +V  lg V ), where
E describes number of graph’s edges.
In Fig. 4 we have graph of calculations time for single
shortest path problem using standard Dijkstra algorithm in
regular grid network with V nodes1 (each path was cal-
culated for the left-lower and the right-upper pair of cells
(nodes) in grid network (similar to one from Fig. 6).
In Fig. 5 we have graph of calculations time for the same
problem but defined as linear programming problem and
solved using GAMS solver. From Fig. 4 results that when
we must compute shortest path in grid network with e.g.
V = 400 nodes (grid with size 2020) then computational
time is about 100 ms (for average case) using 1 GFLOPS
processor and Dijkstra’s algorithm. Let’s suppose that we
simulate battlefield for two-sided company level on the ter-
rain area with size 16 km2 (terrain square with 4 4 km
size, so 4 km/20 = 200 m is side length for each of
400 cells). If we assume, that each company has 3 platoons
then in the same simulation time we must plan movement,
in the worst case, for 2 3 = 6 platoons (as non-divided
1Using computer with 1 GFLOPS processor (like PENTIUM III
800 MHz).
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Fig. 4. Calculations time for single shortest path problem using
Dijkstra algorithm in regular grid network with V nodes.
Fig. 5. Calculations time for single shortest path problem defined
as linear programming problem and solved using GAMS solver
in regular grid network with V nodes.
objects). Because these calculations must be done sequen-
tially (having single processor), so estimation of computa-
tional time for all objects is about 6 100 ms = 600 ms.
In this case we assumed that all processor power is used
for path planning algorithm but it is some simplifica-
tion, of course. Having, i.e. two-sided battalion fighting
(233 = 18 platoons to plan movement in the same sim-
ulation time, in the worst case) we need 18100 ms  2 s.
This delay has significant effect on smoothness of simula-
tion and its visualisation. And we should take into consid-
erations that the network with 2020 cells is small from
among needed in battlefield simulation process.
There are three ways to increase effectiveness of considered
problems:
– decreasing the size of terrain-based graph to de-
crease the computational time of paths planning al-
gorithms [1];
– using specific on-line paths planning algorithms
[10, 12, 13, 16, 32];
– using some partial path update approaches [23, 26].
Each of mentioned above ways has some advantages and
disadvantages.
Advantage of the first way (decreasing the size of graph)
is that the number of merged cells into regions will, in
general, be far fewer than the number of grid cells. The
disadvantages include difficulty in defining the center of the
region and the computation difficulties in determining the
optimum paths between two adjacent cells.
Some partial path planning algorithms (the second way)
plan an off-line path, let the object follow the path, and if
any new environment information is gathered, they partially
re-plan the existing solution. Similar approach for multi-
convoy redeployment in stochastic, dynamically changed
environment, was presented in [26, 27]. Disadvantage of
this approach is that some times, a small change in the
environment may cause re-plan almost a complete path,
which may take a long process time (when the network
size is big).
The basic idea of on-line path planning approach (the
third way), in generally, is that the object is moved step-by-
step from cell to cell using some heuristic method. This
approach is borrowed from movement robots path planning
[13, 23, 32]. The decision about the next move (its di-
rection, speed, etc.) depends on the current location of
the object and environment status. For example, the idea
of RTEF (real-time edge follow) algorithm [32] is to let
the object eliminate closed directions (the directions that
cannot reach the target point) in order to decide on which
way to go (open directions). For instance, if the object has
a chance to realize that moving to north and east will not let
him reach the goal state, then it will prefer going to south
or west. RTEF find out these open and closed directions,
so decreasing the number of choices the object has. How-
ever, this approach has one basic disadvantage. Namely, in
this approach using a few criterions simultaneously to find
optimal (or acceptable) path is difficult and it is rather not
possible to estimate, in advance, moment of achievement
the destination. Moreover, it does not guarantee finding op-
timal solutions and even suboptimal ones may significanly
differ from acceptable.
From this cause, we present in the next section hybrid,
cells-merging-based and partial path planning approach for
route planning in dynamically changed environment.
Considering route planning in the battlefield simulation we
must mention multi-convoy (or multi-object) redeployment
and, in consequence, multi-paths planning. Complexity of
this process depends on the following conditions [29]:
– count of objects in each convoy (the convoy longer
the scheduling of redeployment more complicated);
– have convoys be redeployed simultaneously?
– can convoys be destroyed during redeployment?
– can terrain-based network be destroyed during rede-
ployment?
– have convoys be redeployed through disjoint routes?
– have convoys achieve selected places (nodes) at fixed
time?
– do convoys have to start at the same time?
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– have convoys determine any action strips for moving?
– can convoys be joined and separated during redeploy-
ment?
– have convoys cross through fixed nodes?, etc.
The most often problem related to multi-convoy redeploy-
ment is to move a few convoys through disjoint paths si-
multaneously [25, 30]. Disjoint paths condition results from
safety ensuring for moved convoys. In the battlefield sim-
ulation finding disjoint paths for moved objects (e.g. tanks
inside tank platoon) simplifies its movement because route
for each tank do not cross route for each other and we
avoid potential collisions. Disjoint paths optimization prob-
lem is NP-hard, so some heuristic or other suboptimal ap-
proaches are used [2, 21, 25, 31]. Description of some pro-
totype module for maneuvre planning using disjoint paths
approach was presented in [28].
4. A new multiresolution approach
for increasing route
planning effectiveness
Discussed, in the previous section, region approach for ter-
rain included difficulty in defining the center of the region
and the computational difficulties in determining the opti-
mum paths between two adjacent cells. In this section we
propose some multiresolution-based approach for finding
shortest paths in the big grid networks. We assume that we
have grid graph G = hV ;Ai (see Fig. 7) as representation
of terrain squares (see Fig. 6), where V describes set of
Fig. 6. Terrain space with division on regular grid squares. We
want to move object from the right-lower corner to the left side.
Fig. 7. Grid graph as representation of terrain squares from
Fig. 6. There is marked shortest path from node 64 to node 33.
nodes (squares of terrain), V = jV j, A describes set of arcs,
A = fhx;yi V V : square x is adjacent to square yg.
In this graph we may describe some functions (as
traversability, visibility, crossing time, crossing proba-
bility, detecting probability, etc.) obtaining network as
model of movement environment. We assume that for each
arc hx;yi 2A we have cost c(x;y). The idea of the approach
is to merge geographically adjacent small squares (nodes
belonging to V ) into bigger squares (called b-nodes, see
Fig. 8) and build b-graph G (graph based on the b-nodes,
see Fig. 9) using specific transformation. This transforma-
tion is based on the assumption that we set arc (b-arc)
between two b-nodes x V ; y V when exist such two
nodes x 2 x; y 2 y that hx; yi 2 A. In practice, as nodes
of G graph we will consider strongly connected compo-
nents of b-nodes. Cost c(x; y) of the b-arc hx; yi 2 A is
set on the basis of the biggest cost of some shortest paths
calculated inside the subgraph built on the nodes of x.
Next, in the b-graph we find shortest paths between such
pairs xs; yt of the b-nodes that source node s and target
node t belong to sets xs; yt , respectively.
Formal definition of the graph G is as follows:
G = hV ;Ai ; (1)
where:
V =

x1;x2; : : : ; xn
	
-set of b-nodes, jV j= n,
xi =

xi1;xi2; : : : ; xim
	
V , i = 1;n,
8
i; j
i 6= j
xi\ x j =; i = 1;n; j = 1;n;
n
S
i=1
xi =V ,
A =

hx; yi V V :
9
x2x;y2y
hx; yi 2A

.
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Fig. 8. Merging geographically adjacent small squares from
Fig. 7 into n = 16 bigger squares (b-nodes).
Fig. 9. b-graph for squares merging from Fig. 8. As b-nodes we
use strongly connected components of b-nodes from Fig. 8.
Cost function c(x; y) for b-arc hx; yi we determine as:
c(x; y) = max
fx2xg
F(x; y) ; (2)
where:
F(x; y) = min

y2y:
9
z2x
hz;yi2A

L
 
P(x;y)

,
L
 
P(x; y)

=
l(P(x;y)) 1
å
i=0
c(xi; xi+1),
P(x; y) = (x0 = x; x1; x2; : : : ; xl(P(x;y)) = y),
8
i=0;l(P(x;y)) 1
hxi;xi+1i 2A.
The merging algorithm for b-graph-based shortest paths
planning (MSP-algorithm) is following:
1. merge small squares from graph G (Fig. 7) into
n bigger squares (Fig. 8) (n is parameter of the
algorithm; we show in further discussion how we
can set the optimal value of the n);
2. inside each of the n big squares (b-nodes) deter-
mine strongly connected components obtaining at
least n subgraphs;
3. set each of subgraphs obtained from the Step 2 as
b-nodes and arcs as described by (1) obtaining
graph G (Fig. 9);
4. find shortest paths between each pair of nodes inside
each b-node (subgraph) of G to calculate cost c(x;y)
for each arc of G using Eq. (2);
5. find shortest path in G with cost function c(; ) be-
tween such pairs xs; yt of b-nodes that source node s
and target node t belong to sets xs; yt , respectively.
It’s important to explain that setting in the Step 3 strongly
connected components as b-nodes assure that each node
inside such component is attainable from each other, so if
b-node x is connected (through b-arc) with b-node y then
exist path from each node of x to each node of y.
Let’s estimate time complexity of MSP algorithm. We will
estimate complexity of each step of the algorithm as follows
(we assume that each b-node is strongly connected):
2. determination of strongly connected components in
graph G: we have n b-nodes creating n merged sub-
graphs of G; each subgraph of G has no more than
V
n

nodes, so we have complexity O
 
n 
V
n

=
= O(V );
3. we have n b-nodes so we obtain O(n);
4. shortest path problem between each pair nodes in
N-nodes graph has complexity O(N3); if each sub-
graph of G is strongly connected component of G,
then has n b-nodes (creating subgraphs), so each sub-
graph has
V
n

nodes, hence finding all-pairs shortest
paths in single subgraph has complexity O

 V
n
3

;
because we must calculate it n times, so we have
O

n 
 V
n
3

;
5. finding shortest paths in graph G: because G has
n b-nodes, so using standard Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm we have O(n2).
We omit the merging Step 1 because, having n, we can
prepare this step before simulation. Taking into consider-
ations above estimations we obtain total complexity of the
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algorithm as O

V 3
n2
+n2 +V

(we have also omitted O(n)
because n V ).
There is very interesting and important question from the
point of view of proposed approach effectiveness: how
should we set n to obtain the better effectiveness than
for V ?
Let’s notice that computational complexity of the algorithm
based on the network with small squares2 is O(V 2) and for
the algorithm based on the bigger squares is O

V 3
n2
+n2+V

.
It means that, in sense of complexity symbol O(), the
bigger squares approach is better if the following formula
is satisfied:
V 3
n2
+n2 +V <V 2 (3)
or equivalently, when
n4  (V 2 +V)n2 +V 3 < 0 : (4)
Solving this inequality we obtain, that n 2 [n1;n2], where
n1 =
s
V 2 +V  
p
(V 2 +V)2 4V 3
2
; (5)
n2 =
s
V 2 +V +
p
(V 2 +V)2 4V3
2
: (6)
For example, for the graph from Fig. 7 (V = 64) we obtain
n1  8, n2  64.
In order to estimate how many times faster we compute
problem for finding shortest path in the network with n
big squares (

V 3
n2
+ n2 +V

) with relation to problem for
finding shortest path in the network with V small squares
(O(V 2)) we may formulate acceleration function as fol-
lows3:
A(V;n) =
V 2
V 3
n2
+n2 +V
: (7)
Exemplified graphs of A(V;n) are shown in Figs. 10 and 11.
Having grid network with V squares (nodes) we can for-
mulate following optimization problem: to find such cardi-
nal n, for which
A(V;n) = max
n2[n1;n2]
A(V;n) ; (8)
where n1, n2 are described by formulas (5) and (6).
2Using standard Dijkstra’s shortest paths algorithm (without modifica-
tions increasing its effectiveness).
3Exact to complexity estimation symbol O().
Fig. 10. Graph of A(V; n) function for the network with
V = 64 nodes.
Fig. 11. Graph of A(V; n) function for the network with
V = 10000 nodes.
Let’s notice, that function (7), omitting constraint for n
integer, has real nonnegative maximum for the value
n =
4pV 3. It may be easily shown that for each V > 0,
n 2 [n1; n2]. In practice we are interested in such value
n  n, that square root of
V
n
is cardinal number (it
results from the fact that each of n big squares consist
of
V
n
small squares and in grid structure of the network
a big square has
r
V
n

r
V
n
small squares).
In Table 1 the influence of V on n, n and A(V;n)
is shown. It is easy to observe the best acceleration of
shortest path algorithm using presented approach in regular
grid network with V nodes may be approximated by value
A(V;n)
1
2
p
V .
Let’s notice that from presented estimations and Table 1 re-
sult that for 400-nodes grid graph considered at the begin-
ning of the previous section movement planning for two-
sided battalion fighting (for 18 platoons) will be done in
time 18100=9:5 ms  200 ms.
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Table 1
Influence of V on n, n and A(V;n)
V n n
 V
n

A(V;n)
100 32 25 4 4.3
400 90 100 4 9.5
900 164 225 4 12.3
1600 253 169 9 14.7
2500 354 256 9 20.4
10000 1000 1089 9 49.0
40000 2828 2500 16 96.8
90000 5196 5625 16 147.9
160000 8000 6400 25 181.4
250000 11180 10000 25 243.7
5. Conclusions
The approach presented in the paper gives possibilities to
significantly decrease computational time in terrain-based
route planning when the terrain environment is represented
by regular grid of squares. This approach may be applied,
i.e. for route planning in the simulated battlefield.
The estimations of presented algorithm effectiveness may
be improved through a few ways. The first way is to use in
time complexity estimations the best known shortest-path
algorithm estimation (O(E +V  lg V )) instead complexity
of standard Dijkstra’s algorithm (O(V 2)) because the regu-
lar grid graph is thin (maximal number of direct successors
for any node is 8), so O(8V +V lg V ) < O(V 2) nearly for
all V (exactly for V > 11). The second way is to improve
Step 4 of the algorithm because it seems to be unneces-
sary determinations all-pairs shortest paths in each b-nodes
(subgraphs). It’s seems that is enough to determine short-
est paths between “outside” nodes of b-nodes because only
these nodes are used to link b-node with another. Moreover,
to confirm presented estimations it is essential to conduct
calculations in real grid graphs.
Presented suggestions may be contribution for further
works.
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Paper Interfacing war game
simulations with tactical C2 systems –
dream or reality?
Milan Sˇnajder and Philip W. Holden
Abstract — Decision making process in current tactical
C2 systems is base on planning process of commanders and
their staff. Improving tactical decision making by interfac-
ing war game simulations with tactical C2 systems is achiev-
able. Commander can review the results of the simulation and
subsequently modify the tactical plan. Previously, the use of
“training” simulations was not a viable solution to real world
decision making due to the lengthy time required to input all
of the combat entities, the unit organizations and personnel
dispositions, the equipment configurations, status of the units
and equipment, and the distribution of the available supplies.
Modern C2 systems have all of this information stored in the
common system databases, and this information can be used
to instantiate and populate the simulation through an elec-
tronic adaptation of the data structures to match the require-
ments of the constructive simulation. This paper will provide
description of system approach of interfacing simulation and
C2 system to improve decision-making.
Keywords — C2 systems, war fighting simulation, GF-TCCS,
common operatring picture, NCOE, system architecture, con-
structive simulations ModSAF, SAF, SIMNET CGFs, OTB, DIS,
HLA, evolutionary system development, rapid prototyping, in-
terfacing ModSAF with GF-TCCS, MOD, friendly and enemy
forces, tactical operations centre.
1. Introduction
The Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) is developing an
integrated, automated ground forces tactical command and
control system. Previously, commanders and staffs gener-
ally performed their mission using a manual system, aug-
mented by some commercially available hardware and soft-
ware systems. Some automation and communications sys-
tems operated in an isolated manner but did not provide the
mobility, functional flexibility, security, survivability, and
interoperability required to support the ACR. The accel-
erated tempo of modern, mostly alliance-based combined-
arms warfare demands rapid processing and transfer of C2
information. Ground forces combat at tactical levels re-
quires improved battle command systems, increased capa-
bility to synchronize direct and indirect fire, faster and more
comprehensive access to intelligence data, enhanced situa-
tional awareness and effective force protection. To improve
agility, commanders at all echelons require the means to
gain and use timely battle space information in order to
make informed decisions in a manner consistently faster
than that of the enemy. The ground forces tactical com-
mand and control system (GF-TCCS) is being developed
to meet these requirements, and tools to help the comman-
der in the decision-making process are being developed.
One of the more promising is the use of constructive war
game simulations to explore and analyze the effects of dif-
ferent courses of action.
The Czech Republic has recently installed the war fighting
simulation, ModSAF at the Military Academy in Brno,
and at the training center in Vyskov. These simulations
are being used to train the tactical commanders and staff,
and can be used to model various courses of action, pro-
viding valuable information to support decision making.
The US Government provided the simulation software,
and had a contractor, Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC), perform the installation of ModSAF
in April, 1999. Continuous improvements to the applica-
tion have been made since that time. As the simulation
tools are used, new applications for the simulations are be-
coming evident, including being able to use the simulation
during tactical operations. One of the obstacles to using
simulations during a crisis or military operation is the ex-
tensive amount of time necessary to setup the simulation.
To be effective, the simulation must be loaded with three
categories of information:
 locations, strength and status of the friendly forces,
and the presumed locations, strength, and status of
the opposing forces;
 missions of the respective units;
 environment variables such as terrain and weather.
The integration of constructive simulations with the GF-
TCCS will allow the electronic instantiation and param-
eterization of the simulation with all three categories of
information, allowing it to be used in real-time decision
making.
2. Ground forces tactical command
and control system operational
requirements
The GF-TCCS will provide seamless connectivity from the
lower tactical (squad and platoon) level to the operational
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commands (ground forces command and territorial forces
command). GF-TCCS will be used regularly within gar-
rison, during deployment, and in the field to maintain the
soldier’s proficiency at the level required to respond to the
broad range of potential missions.
GF-TCCS vertically and horizontally integrates information
from tactical to operational command level, and will allow
the commander and staff to:
 collect process and organize large amount of battle
information;
 combine information from multiple sources to create
more complete and useful information;
 process information to analyze trends;
 detect unusual activities, or predict a future situation;
 develop courses of action based on situational factors;
 exchange information efficiently among and within
command posts on the battlefield;
 present information as graphic displays and textual
summaries.
Fundamental to the GF-TCCS operational concept and
relevant common operating picture (COP) is a single en-
try, near-real-time information system, with automated in-
teroperability between each battlefield information system.
GF-TCCS provides situational information and decision
sup-port to commanders and staffs in the execution of the
operational/tactical battle at operational groups and below.
The GF-TCCS command and control subsystems are heav-
ily oriented toward combat operations.
The GF-TCCS command and control sub-systems are
linked by tactical area communications system and by the
combat net radio system. Combat forces, weapon systems
and battlefield automated systems will be supported by the
integrated management and control system that provides
management of the tactical communications.
GF-TCCS will be linked directly to the staff information
system (SIS) ACR, providing the framework for seamless
connectivity from the battalion to the general staff.
The NC3 common operating environment (NCOE) is
the NATO C3 standard profile (NCSP) for computing and
communications infrastructure. The NCSP describes the
structural foundation necessary to build interoperable and
open systems. The purpose of the NCOE is to facilitate
a common understanding of the concepts, constructs and
methods (set up processes) required for targeted NATO sys-
tems. More detail on the NCOE component model can be
found in volume 5 of the NATO C3 Technical Architecture,
NC3 Common Operating Environment.
GF-TCCS’s C2 systems are shown in Fig. 1 and include:
 maneuver control system (MCS);
 fire support control system (FSCS);
 forward area air defense control system (FAADCS);
 intelligence and electronic warfare control system
(IEWCS);
 tactical logistics control system (TLCS);
 battle management vehicular information system
(BMVIS).
The three supporting systems are:
 tactical area communications system (TACS);
 combat net radio system (CNRS);
 integrated management and control system (IMCS).
Fig. 1. Subsystems of the GF-TCCS.
The GF-TCCS provides a simultaneous, relevant picture
of the battlefield at each echelon – from squad/mobile
platform leader to battalion/brigade commander – based
on common data collected through networks of com-
mand posts, commander’s vehicles, computers, sensors and
weapon platforms. This information can be used to in-
stantiate or update the data files used by the constructive
simulations.
3. GF-TCCS system architecture
overview
The GF-TCCS architecture provides two complimentary
methods of distributing C2 data within a single, local area
command post (CP). Within a local area CP, the GF-TCCS
will employ the following message distribution means:
 event bus architecture – for message products that
are relatively small, requiring a wide distribution,
and are time sensitive;
 product server architecture – for information prod-
ucts that are larger, less time sensitive, and have
a limited or sequential pattern of user access or work-
flow.
Externally, the GF-TCCS architecture employs an external
messaging architecture that provides the following data dis-
tribution means:
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Fig. 2. GF-TCCS system architecture.
 AdatP-3 messaging – for NATO interoperability;
 VMF messaging – for inter-GF-TCCS traffic, where
low bandwidth communication median is available or
where low latency messaging is required;
 XML product messaging – for inter- GF-TCCS traf-
fic, where a higher bandwidth communication me-
dian is available, or where larger bulk messages are
required.
The event bus architecture provides a publish/subscribe
mechanism to distribute information (i.e., messages) among
C2 applications. In a publish/subscribe architecture, ap-
plications register themselves as producers of information
(i.e., publishers) and consumers of information (i.e., sub-
scribers). Figure 2 graphically depicts the basic connectiv-
ity of the GF-TCCS event bus.
Two general component types comprise the event bus ar-
chitecture. They are:
 C2 message adapters (C2MA) that provide the in-
terface between the C2 applications and the event
bus. C2MAs distributes information (XML mes-
sages) within a tactical operation center using IP mul-
ticast.
 C2 applications that are the domain applications us-
ing the services of the event bus. C2 applications
may be either client side or server side domain ap-
plications, such as the commander’s information dis-
play (i.e., map) client, the task organization client,
and the product data server.
4. Operational-tactical solutions
This group of applications supports all commanders and
staff officer tasks. In actual solution stage, operational-
tactical solutions (OTS) has about 12 specific applications
for supporting typical commander and staff activities:
 TaGIS – Czech Army RETM for-mat and Aerial snap
composition;
 transportation on own wheels – output – transporta-
tion plan;
 chemical situation awareness;
 planning of the radio-relay communication – schema
of connection availability;
 combat power (force ratio calculation) – output;
 radio visibility awareness;
 message handling system – warning preparation;
 OWNSITREP – situational report preparation;
 DMP lifebook – lists of staff activities, software aids
and active documents;
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Fig. 3. TaGIS – combination of FRAGO, battalion planning overlay and actual UTO.
 TaGIS – combination of FRAGO, battalion planning
overlay and actual UTO (Fig. 3);
 electronic staff lifebook – mission definition.
5. The architectural approach
of the MCS
Maneuver control system (MCS), is a core tactical forces in-
formation system that provides commanders and staff with
the capability to collect, coordinate, and act on real-time
battlefield information.
Through the MCS, the commander transmits critical bat-
tlefield information, courses of action, schemes of ma-
neuver, warning orders, operation orders, priorities, in-
telligence requests, and air operations requests. The MCS
database and data files provide the information necessary
to load the simulations with the friendly unit missions and
objectives.
The main purpose of the event bus architecture is to
distribute and receive time-sensitive battlefield events data
(i.e., situation awareness data) between interested C2 ap-
plications. It connects the publishers and subscribers of
messages together. The C2MA listens for a published mes-
sage, validates the format of the message, and distributes
it to subscribers on the bus through the use of the sub-
scriber’s C2MA. The core technology for the event bus
is IP multicast, which is a standard IP network-level proto-
col.
The C2 message adapter is the middle-ware component that
provides the event bus services to C2 applications. Its role
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Fig. 4. GF-TCCS event bus architecture and C2 message.
is to handle subscriptions of C2 applications, listen for mes-
sages on the bus, and to publish messages from C2 appli-
cations.
6. C2 application architecture
GF-TCCS C2 functionality is provided by a set of server-
side and client-side domain applications (Fig. 4). Each ap-
plication component provides a unique set of C2 services
that are mutually exclusive to that application component.
The applications components are:
 graphical information display (GID);
 battlefield alert server (BAS).
7. Constructive simulations
Constructive simulations include a category of computer
generated forces (CGFs) that simulate battlefield entities
and aggregates of those entities. The simulation of the
entities includes their physical characteristics, tactical be-
haviors and decisions processes, and the interactions with
other entities. Entities can range from an individual soldier,
to ground vehicles such as tanks or armored personnel car-
riers, to aircraft or ships. The entities can be guided and
controlled by human operators using joysticks or keyboards,
or full mission simulators such as the SIMNET or CCTT
manned simulators, or the entities can be completely gen-
erated and controlled by the computer. Entities entirely
controlled by the computer are referred to as “automated
forces”. Where some human involvement in the decision
process is involved, they are referred to as “semi-automated
forces” (SAF). These simulations are routinely used to sup-
port army applications in three modeling and simulation
domains: training, exercise, military operations (TEMO);
advanced concepts and requirements (ACR); and research,
development and acquisition (RDA).
ModSAF has a modular, data-driven architecture that al-
lows the development and integration of specific detailed
models that become an additive part of the overall system.
ModSAF’s main modules are the human interface to the
simulation system (SAF station), SAF Sims, the entity, and
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Fig. 5. The typical Czech constructive simulation system configuration.
aggregate models. SAF Sims and SAF stations use a com-
mon database to communicate with each other, and use the
DIS protocol to communicate with the synthetic environ-
ment and other simulations and simulators. The common
database provides command and control information for the
simulation of organizations, while the DIS communications
are oriented to the physical world. The simulation operator
has the ability to create, modify, save or load scenario files,
overlay files, minefield templates, and other setup parame-
ters. The simulation can also start/resume, stop/pause, and
restart an exercise run based on external input in the form
of simulation management messages.
8. The Czech simulation system
The Army of the Czech Republic is currently using the US
warfighting simulation, ModSAF, at the Military Academy
in Brno, and at the training center in Vyskov. The ACR
has developed expertise in using and modifying the simu-
lations with the help of the US provided source code for
the simulation and advanced developer training courses.
The simulation engineers at the Military Academy have
developed new capabilities for the Czech simulation sys-
tem (Fig. 5). The ACR has made a number of enhance-
ments to the simulation system, and developed the capabil-
ity to build the digital terrain databases necessary to sup-
port the modular semi-automated forces (ModSAF) and its
successor, the oneSAF testbed baseline (OTB) synthetic
natural environment requirements. These enhanced sim-
ulations are being used to train the tactical commanders
and staff, and can be used to model various courses of
action, providing valuable information. The ModSAF sim-
ulation system builds upon the previous United States of
America Army simulations that started with the simula-
tor networking (SIMNET) program. The original Mod-
SAF incorporated the software code associated with both
SIMNET SAF and ODIN (73 Easting) SAF. In 1993, the
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
began building ModSAF by developing an open simula-
tion architecture, which could be used to create synthetic
agents for a variety of distributed interactive simulation
(DIS) applications. The initial effort fielded a system
in 1993 to support the what-if simulation system for ad-
vanced research and development (WISSARD) program,
which had a requirement for beyond visual range, air-to-
air engagement scenarios. After the initial release, the re-
maining battlefield operating systems (BOS) and behaviors
were added to ModSAF to fill out the synthetic battlefield.
ModSAF 1.2 was released in 1994 and included the ma-
jority of systems that had been represented in the previous
SIMNET SAF version. ModSAF 2.0 followed in 1995,
ModSAF 2.1 in 1996, ModSAF 3.0 in 1997, ModSAF 4.0
in 1998 and finally, the last version of the simulation, Mod-
SAF 5.0 was released in 1999. The successor to ModSAF is
the one semi-automated forces testbed baseline that will be
replaced by the OneSAF objective system, which is planned
to be fielded in 2004.
ModSAF has been expanded to include many aspects of
the modern battlefield, to include the effects of weapons of
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mass destruction (WMD). ModSAF can also model the lo-
gistics aspects of the engagement, and has the capability to
model support functions such as medical support to oper-
ations. The highly detailed constructive simulation has the
capability to model the evaluation of medical conditions of
personnel, and to model evacuation of injured individuals
by various means, to include vehicles, and rotary wing air-
craft (RWA). The simulation also models personnel status,
including wounded in action (WIA) and killed in action
(KIA) as a result of casualties caused by munitions, det-
onations, collisions, and non-combat illness/injury. The
simulated injuries can range from smoke inhalation and
other environmental affects to death by weapons of mass
destruction.
9. Evolutionary systems development
and rapid prototyping
Both the development of the GF-TCCS and the Mod-
SAF/OTB simulation systems have benefited from the evo-
lutionary development process also known as “spiral de-
velopment”. This development methodology is based on
two main fundamentals:
1. Incremental development. Both whole complex and
each subsystem are (and will be) developed in a se-
quence of increments. From the first increment, each
of them is fully operable and fully integrated with all
preceding increments.
2. Rapid prototyping. Every planned element and pre-
pared system is prepared like a prototype and con-
secutively tested in development labs, in a special
testbed and in the field as well.
Rapid prototyping, together with experimentation, provides
an effective tool for resolving issues, experimental data col-
lection, reducing risk early, and determining the adequacy
of requirements, design, and new GF-TCCS’s system capa-
bilities before committing major resources.
The attributes of the proposed approach to evolutionary
GF-TCCS development include:
 use of software development environments/tools for
rapid prototyping of functionality;
 object-oriented design that allow rapid integration of
COTS software;
 NATO OSE software standards and practices;
 documentation appropriate for expansion into formal
specifications;
 continuous interaction and feedback from the military
end-users.
10. Integrating ModSAF with the
GF-TCCS
Many companies and organizations use the open archi-
tecture ModSAF development environment. The source
code can be compiled using the operating system native
UNIX C compilers, or the freeware toolset GNU gcc. The
ModSAF distribution package includes scripts (awk, sed,
lex, etc.) and makes files to support distributed develop-
ment and experimentation. The US Government provided
the ModSAF source code to the Czech Ministry of Defense
(MoD) with a distribution agreement that allows unlimited
use by the Czech MoD. The simulation engineers at the
Czech Military Academy have made several modifications
and enhancements to the ModSAF and OTB simulation sys-
tems. The intent of the liberal distribution agreement is
to allow the users to develop additional capabilities, as
their needs require. The simulation runs on multiple plat-
forms, including the PC (Linux), Silicon Graphics (SGI),
SUN, and DEC Alpha platforms. The computer require-
ments are relatively low, and the simulation can run on
a PC using the Linux operating system with a 300 MHz
processor, 128 Mbytes of RAM. This allows integration
with the GF-TCCS without the problems normally asso-
ciated with interfacing different computational platforms.
Much of the Mod-SAF simulation software is written in
the C language, with Java used for recent additions to the
Graphical User Interface. The modular architecture and
separate GUI module allow the ability to create a custom
user interface using the Czech language. Although there is
a strong effort within the ACR to use the English language
for interoperability with NATO partners, the ability to have
a Czech language interface greatly improves the ease of use
for the average Czech soldier.
11. Standards compliance
In order to ensure compatibility with other NATO coun-
tries, standards compliance is crucial to the long-term suc-
cess of the project. Compliance with the NATO model-
ing and simulation master plan is considered essential, and
the simulations must provide support for a standard syn-
thetic environment and be able to communicate using
HLA and DIS 2.0.4 protocols. ModSAF meets these crite-
ria for interoperability, although the operation in an HLA
environment requires the use of a gateway such as the
MaK technology HLA gateway, or the Naval Air Warfare
Center – Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD) gateway.
The ModSAF simulation appears to be functionally suited
for integration with the GF-TCCS since the resolution of en-
tities and the convention for identifying vehicles precludes
ambiguity because the provisions for bumper numbers and
task organizations is compatible with the ACR requirements
and conventions. The capability to simulate dynamic en-
vironments, and the capability to assess damage to prepo-
63
Milan Sˇnajder and Philip W. Holden
sitioned and dynamic objects due to detonations of muni-
tions, provides the level of detail to support the decision
making process used at the tactical level.
12. Behavioral specificity
One of the traditional obstacles to using simulations to sup-
port decision making in a real-time environment is the ex-
tensive time required to create the necessary simulation
configuration that reflects the current operational situation.
Often, a team of multiple simulation specialists would re-
quire several days to create the data needed to represent the
situation, and to load that information into the computer.
For large and complex scenarios the process can require
several weeks to be prepared. In order to support real-time
Czech tactical requirements, the process of gathering the
information on the current situation and loading the infor-
mation to start a simulation run must take less than 30 min-
utes, and preferably less than five minutes. The ModSAF
simulation is structured such that the setup and parameter
information is contained in data files, and even the behav-
iors and unit missions can be instantiated on most entities
using data file modifications. Many behaviors can be im-
plemented with data strings, and configuration parameters
can be used to customize a behavior for a unique situation.
Under this approach, behaviors such as those required for
a road march can be used on any ground vehicle or ground
unit. However, the weapon or vehicle specific behaviors
such as the tactical actions that differentiate a tank platoon
road march from a mechanized platoon road march are not
represented in the generic behavior.
The ModSAF simulation supports three basic types of be-
havior control: Pre-planned, operator controlled, and
automatic reaction. The pre-planned mode of operation
allows the user to specify the sequencing of behaviors for
a unit, and allows control of the transitions from one be-
havior phase to the next. Transitions can be timephased,
or caused by actions such as crossing a control measure,
commands from the operator, or other simulation events.
With the operator control mode, the SAF operator has the
ability to modify missions during execution of a scenario,
to include making immediate interventions to make tempo-
rary modifications to the mission. The automatic reaction
mode allows entity reactions that are enabled by data, and
when activated, a reaction overrides the current mission
with a new behavior. The reaction can be resumed at the
direction of the SAF operator.
Behavior models interface with the physical models
through defined APIs called generic model interfaces
(GMIs). GMI facilitates physical model extension, imple-
menting each physical model with one distinct software unit
in the form of a C language library, functionally becoming
a “plug and play” system, with physical models capable of
being easily inserted or deleted.
In order to make an entity such as a T-72 tank move, the
movement behavior provides a proper command by calling
GMIs supported by the physical model. Then the generic
Fig. 6. The GMI provides the physical model invocation.
physical model that interfaces to a specific physical model,
calls a proper physical model for implementation. In this
case, it is a tracked physical model that has T-72 tracked
hull characteristics. Figure 6 shows this relationship. In-
stead of using the specific model such as a T-72 tracked
model, the SAF behaviors use an API that provides generic
access to physical models. Thus, behavior models can uni-
formly invoke functionality regardless of the physical model
that executes the invocation.
13. Modeling of tactical electronic
and communications systems
The simulation used to support the GF-TCCS must have
the capability to model the intelligence gathering systems
such as the artillery and mortar locating radars, as well
as the electronic intelligence and signal intelligence sys-
tems. The ModSAF generic sensor model (GSM) facili-
tates the implementation of new sensing algorithms. For
example, a ground-based sensor can be created that au-
tomatically reports activity of targets within a designated
area. ModSAF also has a generic radio physical model,
that can be used to instantiate any of the existing and
planned Czech military radio types.
14. Integration architecture
The concept for integration of the ModSAF simulation with
the GF-TCCS is to build a conversion utility that will take
the pertinent information from the GF-TCCS databases and
insert or modify the information in the ModSAF common
data-base. This conversion utility will simplify the existing
laborious process of loading and instantiating the simula-
tion, so that the entire process can be accomplished au-
tomatically with no manual user interventions. There are
major information areas that require conversion and instan-
tiation:
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Friendly forces information as it is known and recorded
in the GF-TCCS:
 unit table of organization and entity missions;
 unit placement on the synthetic terrain;
 unit strength and supply status;
 vehicle status and supply of fuel, crew, and ammuni-
tion.
Enemy force information according to intelligence esti-
mates and enemy order of battle:
 unit table of organization and entity missions;
 unit placement on the synthetic terrain;
 unit strength and supply status;
 vehicle status and supply of fuel, crew, and ammuni-
tion.
The information for each of these areas for both the
friendly and enemy forces is contained within the GF-TCCS
databases. The integration effort is to provide the conver-
sion between the different formats and to expand or aug-
ment the data as it is loaded into the ModSAF simulation.
In addition, there will be a development process to build the
user interface necessary to cause the conversion and data
loading, and to integrate the display of the simulation data
on the tactical situational display in the Tactical Operations
Center (TOC) as the simulation is running.
The VTUE development team that is building the GF-TCCS
has been examining the situation with the ModSAF sim-
ulation being used at the Czech Military Academy, and
the contractor, DelInfo, is using this knowledge for the de-
velopment of the interface. Presently, the GF-TCCS is in
the development stage. The first increment of MCS SW
package is used in the Rapid Reaction Forces of the ACR
since 2001.
The ModSAF simulation is currently being used to sup-
port training exercises at the Brigade and below level at
the Military Academy in Brno. The current estimate for
the integration of the simulations with the command and
control system is for starting the integration in mid 2003,
with a demonstration capability available in the first quar-
ter 2004, and full implementation by the end of 2004.
15. Conclusion
This paper has presented an overview of the architecture
approach for integrating the ModSAF constructive simula-
tion with the GF-TCCS. The goal of the enclosed architec-
ture has been to present a basic decision support system
infrastructure that is both flexible and presents a minimum
development risk. This is achieved by leveraging both mar-
ketplace capabilities and verified market trends to simplify
the information-processing approach and subsequent imple-
mentation. The backbone of the architecture is based on
internal technology, in particular the HTTP and XML tech-
nologies. These technologies, combined with important ar-
chitectural principals of loosely-coupled distributed com-
puters, are molded into a baseline C2 infrastructure upon
which GF-TCCS applications may be developed.
Although there are additional design efforts necessary to
move forward, the GF-TCCS architecture represents a sig-
nificant first step towards creating a base environment for
the rapid development of C2 capabilities and software prod-
ucts. This architecture approach is ideally suited to spiral
development and incremental upgrades.
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Paper Web-based e-learning
environment
Milan Misˇovicˇ
Abstract — Using a progressive information technologies for
development of web-based courses and their administration
brings a lot of practical and theoretical problems. We know
web course problem is only small solution concerning con-
struction of a large entire web-based e-learning environment.
One of a practical problem is how to construct web-based
electronic courses that have to meet international AICC stan-
dards. Implementation of such strict statements resulted in
a lot of small or larger difficulties if we had used an elemen-
tary HTML editor. Using a special web course oriented ed-
itors can absolutely solve this problem. The second problem
is construction of the web-based e-learning application that
can administrate such web courses and takes into considera-
tion AICC regulations. Development of such web applications
is founded on the latest web technologies. This article intro-
duces one approach to the modeling of the two most impor-
tant components (web-based course, web-based application)
of the web-based e-learning environment, convenient for Mil-
itary Academy in Brno and Czech army. The article outlines
the structure of web subject, e-learning environment and their
implementation1. The LMS’s structure and its functionality,
based on a snaps algebra, belong to important results of the
article.
Keywords — distance learning, e-learning, web-based course,
web-based e-learning environment, web distributed application,
learning management system, web course subjects, clients, ac-
cess permission rights, communication, administration of web-
based courses, e-learning functions, client interface, LMS man-
ager, manager operations, activity snaps, algebra of snaps.
1. Introduction
According to the American Council on Education (Guid-
ing Principles for Distance Education in a Learning Soci-
ety, 1996) we can take over its definition of distant learn-
ing as: “Distance learning is a system and a process that
connects all participants and resources (learners with dis-
tributed learning resources, educators with learners, learn-
ers with learners)”. The term “distance learning” is very
often interchanged by the second term “distance education”.
There are two categories of distance education delivery sys-
tems: synchronous and asynchronous. The first system re-
quires the simultaneous participation of all students and
instructors, by another words – interaction is done in “real
time”. There are known such implementations as: inter-
active TV, tele- and video-conferencing, web-conferencing,
synchronous chat, virtual whiteboard etc.
1Some results from a complex solution for the project of web-based
learning environment.
On the other hand, the second system does not require the
simultaneous participation of all students and instructors.
Students do not need to be gathered together in the same
place at the same time. They can select their education
time and learning resources that are needed. This system
of education is more flexible then the former. There are
known such implementations as: correspondence courses,
videotaped courses, e-mail and web-based courses, etc.
The present and future possibility of distance learning is
very tightly connected with the development of electronic
telecomputing technology, especially with development of
Internet/Intranet and multimedia technology. Modern web-
based electronic learning environment can significantly in-
tegrate such tools for presentation as voice, video, and data
connections between and among instructors, learners, sub-
ject matters experts, virtual libraries and Internet resources.
Modern web-based e-learning consists of several mutually
dependent parts, included in its strategy:
– development of web course content (subject matters);
– pedagogical approach;
– web course administration;
– web course distribution.
Fig. 1. Web course content structure.
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Fig. 2. Web course subject structure.
Development of web-based e-learning courses is founded
on web technologies HTML and DHTML. There are very
often used special course editors. These editors can usually
solve problem of web course distribution, too. Pedagogi-
cal approach and web course administration are enabled by
a special web-based e-learning application (learning ma-
negement system – LMS). Modeling of such applications
has to follow a lot of important rules.
2. Web course’s structure
Generally, any web course can be constructed as a set of
several web subjects. Even though, the common case is
only one web subject.
The content of any web course can consist of the following
parts (Fig. 1):
– home page, welcome page and introducing pages for
all web subjects;
– web subjects, which are expressed very often by
HTML or DHTML pages;
– the data base “web course properties”; this data base
points to information linkages among the compo-
nents of web subjects.
Figure 2 outlines possible web subject structures. This
structure corresponds to the current subject in Military Col-
lege Education.
3. Web-based learning environment
structure
In order to model the e-learning problem domain we have
to recognize all its structure, properties etc. Finding out of
Fig. 3. Structure of web-based learning environment in subjects.
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Fig. 4. Technical and software equipment of the Intranet and Internet web-based learning environment: (a) teacher’s computer:
Win98/Win2000, personal web server or Internet information server, learning management system, web course subjects; (b) military
academy’s server.
a good structure is the main problem. Next structure can
be acceptable:
– web course subjects;
– clients of web course;
– education supervising;
– communication;
– data bases: “web course properties”, “operational
DB”, “reserved DB”;
– administration of web course – learning management
system.
This structure enables connectivity clients – web subjects –
data base only by means of the LMS (Fig. 3). This idea
can influence the data model and web subject protection
(code on a server farm).
The LMS will certainly appear as a web-based application
with more then three layers (client code, server code, dis-
tributed data and distributed code).
Figure 4 outlines elementary implementation of the LMS
on teacher’s computer and on military academy’s server.
4. The main e-learning’s functions
The analysis of web-based e-learning environment subjects
has shown that the list of the main functions should contain
at least the following functions:
1. To enable client access to the web subjects according
to client access permission.
2. To provide a guest show for some clients.
3. To make up possibility for a full text searching in the
content of web subjects.
4. To register students activities in web subjects (mon-
itoring).
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5. To enable all teachers to get information about any
student activities.
6. To give study possibilities for young teachers.
7. To organize all types of communication.
8. To provide comfort for modification of web subject
content.
9. To make up a flexible communication with data base
server.
10. To protect all information which has fatal meaning
for LMS.
11. To record all activities in web-based e-learning envi-
ronment.
5. Learning management system
The learning management system (Fig. 5) is web-based
e-learning application for web course administration. Its
structure corresponds to the web-based e-learning environ-
ment (Fig. 6). Generally, it should play several important
roles, for example:
– administration and communication roles;
– pedagogical role;
– service role.
Special managers or assistants perform each role in the
LMS. The LMS core reacts on all internal events.
Fig. 5. The LMS’s structure.
All makers of web courses have to follow AICC regulations
(Fig. 7). It can be fulfilled by selection one of modern web
course editors.
Interaction between the constructed web course and the
LMS is performed by means of special “interaction doors”.
6. Philosophic fundament
of the LMS’s work
Philosophy of the LMS’ work is founded on producing and
processing of snaps. The snap instances are the main prod-
ucts of the LMS. Snaps are produced in all reactions on
events and their usage has a lot of possibilities for process-
ing. Each instance of a snap is addressed by web course
session-ID, web course subject-ID, client-ID, time and own
snap-ID. Therefore client, web course session, web course
subject, web subject test, transaction and time can describe
each snap instance.
There are two types of snaps. The first snap is called regis-
tration snap. It contains only a name of performed transac-
tion in its properties. In addition the previous possibilities,
the second “full” snap contains also input and output pa-
rameters of executed transaction.
Creation of the snap is almost performed according to
Fig. 8.
Internal meaning of a snap is given by its using in the LMS.
All types of snaps are named in Fig. 9.
The LMS application generally accepts seven of client
types:
– administrator,
– guarantee of web course,
– guarantee of web subject,
– instructor,
– student,
– external client and guest.
Valid access permission rights are defined in advance. The
content of each access permission right consists of opera-
tions, those can be started by client from his interface.
By the way, snaps can be used for evaluation of learning
progress quality, web subjects, pedagogical activities of in-
structors and convenience of the LMS.
This large using of snaps converts the LMS system to the
learning quality management system (LQMS).
Definition 1. Entity “snap” is regarded as notation
(C; Wc ; Ws ; Wt ; T ; t), where C; Wc ; Ws ; Wt ; T ; and t are
sets of clients, web courses, web subjects, web tests, trans-
actions and time t0 : t1 for e-learning environment session.
The value of T determines a snap type.
The following text describes a special snap algebra which
gives basic theoretical and practical approach to the
snaps.
Operations in this algebra provide sufficient evaluation pos-
sibilities for all types of web course administrations. These
operations are defined with respect to compatibility of
snaps. Therefore, compatibility will be the basic property
of snaps.
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Fig. 6. Implementation of e-learning’s functions in the LMS.
Fig. 7. Using of AICC regulations.
Fig. 8. Creating of snaps.
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Fig. 9. Structure of web environment snaps.
7. The snap algebra
Set of elements ...........Instances of snaps x; y; z;...
Special element ..........Empty snap e e e .
Definition 2. Snaps x, y are l -compatible, if the sets
fCx;W xc ;W xs ;W xt ; T x; txg,
fCy;W yc ;W ys ;W yt ; T
y
; tyg have not empty disjunction.
l -compatibility represents a certain number of equalities
from the set
fCx=Cy; W xc =W yc ; W xs =W ys ; W xt =W yt ; T
x
=T y; tx= tyg.
Interpretation l -compatibility by one equality leads to com-
patibility of the first level:
Client ................................. x y () l : Cx =Cy
compatibility
Web course ....................... x y () l : W xc =W yc
compatibility
Web subject ...................... x y () l : W xs =W ys
compatibility
Transaction........................ x y () l : T x = T y
compatibility
l -compatibilities of the second or higher level provide very
useful sets of e-learning environment snaps. For example:
Client-subject l : Cx =Cy; W xs =W ys
compatibility
generates all snaps of given client with the same web sub-
ject.
Subject-test l : W xs =W ys ; W xt =W yt
compatibility
generates all snaps of given web subject and web test in it.
Basic operation................. t -concatenation for tx < ty of
the both snaps x, y with the same l -compatibility.
Notation......... xy (y x is not defined).
Operation is not symmetrical but there is valid
e
e
e  x = x e e e = x and x (y z) = (x y) z.
Concatenation x  y  z of the snaps x, y, z with
l -compatibility, represents a string of the same compat-
ibility. For graphical presentation such strings we can use
following chart:
Another general operations.......... x < y; x > y,
(time relations)
Operation x = y is not defined and x 6= y is trivial.
Axioms..........There are not the same snaps for given client.
Session with the e-learning environment is
the highest snap.
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There are four very important strings within learning
progress administration:
1. Session with e-learning environment.
2. Session with web course.
3. Session with web subject.
4. Session with web subject test.
Each of these strings starts with “Start snap with...” and
ends with “End snap of...”. We can construct these strings
by next operations. The snaps expressing the moving (click-
ing on hyperlinks) within a web subject have huge impor-
tance, too.
We can defined a specific number of convenient operations
for each set of l -compatible snaps, naturally with respect
to requirements of administration types.
For example, we can suggest a list of such operations in
the client-compatibility with respect to needs of learning
progress administration:
E-learning environment session......List of all e-learning
EES (C) environment sessions
Web course sessions........................List of all web course
WCSS (C; t0 : t1) sessions
Web course session......................... List of sessions
WCS (C;Wc; t0 : t1) with given web course
Web subject sessions.......................List of sessions
WSSS (C;Wc; t0 : t1) with all subjects
Web subject session.........................List of all sessions
WSS (C;Wc;Ws; t0 : t1) with the same subject
Hyperlink web subject session........String of used
HWSS (C;Wc;Ws; t0 : t1) hyperlinks in subject
Hyperlink course session.................String of used
HCS (C;Wc;Ws; t0 : t1) hyperlinks in course
Question moving string...................String of movements
QMS (C;Wc;Ws;Wt ; t0 : t1) in web test
Question answer string....................String of answers
QAS (C;Wc;Ws;Wt ; t0 : t1) in web test
By the same manner we can design a lot of useful opera-
tions in another very important sets of l -compatible web
snaps. For example, we can observe web subject using the
loading of selected LMS transaction, pedagogical instruc-
tor activities etc. Naturally, if we find out that our list of
snap types is not sufficient for the purposes of administra-
tion types, we can introduce another snap types. By this
manner we can enlarge the LMS application.
8. Manager operations
The manager operations are derived from the main system
functions of e-learning environment. The number of such
operations can be larger then one hundred. Clients can start
these operations from theirs interfaces only in accordance
with access permission rights. These rights are different
for each client type.
For example we introduce only several important manager
operations:
ACCESS MANAGER
Guest show
start
Login
modification
Sign in/Sign out
Guest show
end
Login creation
Registration
Login
expiration
Login cancel
Login prologation
Personal
data
modification
Login
prolongation
prompt
Access
Verification of access Login permission
frequency processing right
delegation
Access manager settings
........................................
Message creation
Message
archiving
Message
canceling
MESSAGE MANAGER
Message
restriction views
Message
blocking
Message sending
Message
symptom settings
Client
calendar
View of messages
Message folder
creation/canceling
Class table
operations
Message view
Discussion table
operations
Message
manager
settings
........................................
9. Conclusion
There are a lot of problems that belong to the range of
web-based e-learning environment. This article has pointed
only to the selected set of structural problems during its
modeling. One complete modeling solution has been given
in the research report “Problem Domain of eLearning” that
was reviewed and accepted in January 23, 2002 (see [3]).
References
[1] J. Rosemberg, e-Learning Strategies for Delivering Knowledge in
the Digital Age. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
[2] M. Misˇovicˇ, Case study, project “Support of distance learning”. Mil-
itary Academy Brno, Czech Republic, 2001.
[3] M. Misˇovicˇ, Research report, “Problem Domain of eLearning”, Mil-
itary Academy Brno, Czech Republic, 2002.
72
Web-based e-learning environment
[4] M. Misˇovicˇ, “Basics for Development of Web Courses”,
NATINEADS, Brno, Czech Republic, 2002.
[5] M. Misˇovicˇ, “eLearning in Military Professional Education”, BEL-
COM, Prague, Czech Republic, 2002.
[6] L. Petras, “Contemporary state and future of military personal edu-
cation”, Case study, Military Academy Brno, Czech Republic, 2001.
[7] J. R. Ballard and R. D. Kirkwood, “Interactive education for 21st
century – the armed forces staff college and education of future
decision-makers”, I/ITSEC, Orlando, USA, 2001.
[8] J. Camacho, “The impact of advanced distributed learning (ADL)
on joint readiness – an operational view”, I/ITSEC, Orlando, USA,
2001.
[9] M. Myjak et al., “The quest towards an advanced learning manage-
ment system”, I/ITSEC, Orlando, USA, 2001.
[10] F. Ionescu et al., “Collaborative distributed learning environment for
continuing education”, ITEC, Lille, 2002.
[11] F. Gardiner, “Training quality system – where QMS meets LMS”,
ITEC, Lille, 2002.
Milan Misˇovicˇ an Associate
Professor, senior lecturer, Doc-
tor of Natural Sciences, Ph.D.
of the Military Academy in
Brno, Czech Republic; Head of
IS Programming Tools Group.
His area of scientific inter-
est comprises: theoretical infor-
matics, theoretical and practi-
cal aspects of software engi-
neering and information engi-
neering, IS methodologies, integrated development envi-
ronments, development of web applications.
e-mail: milan.misovic@vabo.cz
Department of Automated Command Systems
and Informatics
Military Academy Brno
612 00 Brno, Czech Republic
73
Paper An effective method of channels
assignment for third generation
cellular system
Marek Amanowicz, Piotr Gajewski, and Jarosław Krygier
Abstract — An original hybrid method of channels assign-
ment for DS-CDMA system is discussed in the paper. This
method combines standard PN codes assignment policy and
dynamic channel assignment procedure that minimise the cost
of channel assignment. OPNET simulation model DS-CDMA
system was used for assessment of the hybrid method. The re-
sults of simulation presented in the paper confirmed that the
proposed method importantly improves the quality of services
in the third generation cellular system.
Keywords — W-CDMA, dynamic channel assignment, 3G.
1. Introduction
The work on the development of world-wide standard of
third generation (3G) mobile radio system on the basis of
UMTS/FPLMTS/IMT-2000 has been carried out by stan-
dardization institutes of Europe (ETSI), Japan (ARIB) and
United States (ITA) under the umbrella of the International
Telecommunication Union. Wideband code division multi-
ple access (CDMA) has been chosen as the mainstream air
interface solution for such networks. It is assumed that
IMT-2000 will provide a wide range of services, espe-
cially multimedia and high-bit-rate packet data which re-
quire a high network capacity and appropriate quality of
services.
The capacity of 3G-CDMA systems depends on the level of
interference caused by each user. On the other hand the in-
terferences depend on many factors such as user’s activity,
required data rate, geographical deployment of the users,
power control accuracy, type of code sequences and its as-
signment scheme, etc. [1–3]. Most of these factors are out
of control as they depend mainly on the user’s behaviour.
However power control procedures or channels assignment
policy can be modified in a way which allows improving
the system’s capacity and QoS.
In our investigations we have focussed on the code se-
quences management method for DS-CDMA system. The
hybrid channels assignment method (HCA) presented here
combines two schemes, e.g. fixed and dynamic channel
assignment.
The channels assignment policy for standard DS-CDMA
system as well as system conditions concerning code man-
agement methods are shortly described in Section 2 of this
paper. In Section 3 a general idea of HCA algorithm is pre-
sented and discussed. A general idea of HCA algorithm is
presented and discussed. Simulation method was used for
verification and validation of the proposed method. A de-
scription of OPNET simulation model as well as simulation
results we have obtained are presented in Section 4.
2. Channel assignment for DS-CDMA
systems
In widely known systems (like IS-95, IS-665, UMTS) the
same sets of code sequences is used by each base station
but with different phase shifts [4, 7]. The auto-correlation
and cross-correlation features of such codes are specific for
the defined codes family and in consequence they limit the
system capacity [2, 3, 5]. The spreading codes manage-
ment procedure is often based on simple choosing of one
(or more) from predefined big family of codes (code shifts).
The user’s requirements for services that should be provided
by the mobile communications system cause the necessity
of handling many services in the same time. Since such
services are provided with different data rates, additional
codes are used, for example orthogonal variable spreading
factor (OVSF) channelisation codes in UMTS. They are de-
signed for fitting different data rate services into the wide-
band radio channel with a constant bandwidth. The spread-
ing of baseband signals is realised using so called scram-
bling codes (gold sequences in UMTS). OVSF codes are
mutually orthogonal, so the basic co-channel interferences
depend on scrambling auto and cross-correlation functions.
By using different scrambling codes families with differ-
ent correlation characteristics as well as by their efficient
management it is possible to decrease the total level of
interference and in consequence increase the system’s ca-
pacity.
3. Hybrid channels assignment
for 3G wireless systems
The channel assignment to a particular call could be re-
alised by calculating minimal correlation factors at the
time of assignment, with regard to each channel in the
interference area or by sharing the channels into separate
groups. In our case, cellular network is divided into three-
cell groups like in sectorised systems. Let us assume the
same radius in each sector. The proposed HCA channel
assignment scheme is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In this case
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all Nk channels are divided into two groups F – “fixed”
channels (can be used over the whole system) and T – “dy-
namic” channels (optimised channels over the sectors).
Fig. 1. Channels assignment scheme: M – number of fixed
channels; A, B, C – numbers of dynamic channels.
All channels can be centrally managed. The first
F = f1;2; : : : ;Mg channels are available in each cell.
The last T = fM+1; M+2; : : : ;Nkg channels are split into
three sectors. In this group of channels we have K  M
channels optimised in each sector and
 
(Nk  M)=3

chan-
nels, which are used for priority calls and for handled over
calls.
Fig. 2. Channels arrangement.
The total number of channels NT in the system can be
calculated as follows:
NT = L M+[L=3]  jFj+
 
L 3  [L=3]

 jFj=3 ; (1)
where: L is the number of cells in the system, jF j – number
of channels in the set F and [L=3] – an integer part of L=3.
A channel assignment for a particular call from group F is
quite simple. While a new call arrives the first free channel
is used. Of course the criterion of minimal reuse distance
should be fulfilled.
If all M fixed channels are already in usage then the dy-
namic channel is selected for a new call. For channel as-
signment from set T , an algorithm proposed in [6] is rec-
ommended. In this case, channels are allocated on the basis
of minimisation of so-called cost function Cx(i) defined for
each available channel among all interference environment
of cell x, e.g:
Cx(i) = min
i2L(x)

Cx(i)
	
; (2)
where: i – channel assigned to the new call in cell x;L(x) –
set of channels available for cell x (so excluding channels
assigned to x and all cells from its interference environ-
ment), Cx(i) – total cost of each channel from L(x).
The cost Cx(i) is calculated as a sum of weighted function
qx(i) and the costs Cx(k; i) of channel i assignment related
to each k channel from interference neighbourhood I(x),
where Cx(k; i) is an integer value from 0 to 3.
After releasing the dynamic channels are reallocated again
in order to choose the optimal interference level using sim-
ilar rule. In [6] this algorithm is proposed as a unique
method for the whole cellular network. In our case, the
allocation of dynamic channel is used only if there are not
enough fixed channels.
4. Simulation experiments
Correctness of the above channels assignment algorithm
as well as its efficiency for DS-CDMA cellular system
was assessed during simulation experiments. Taking into
account DS-CDMA system complexity, the OPNET sim-
ulation package was used for investigations. The basic
elements of implemented network are shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. An example of DS-CDMA cellular network.
The network consists of 34 base stations (nb), 10 ra-
dio network controllers (rnc), 3 mobile switching cen-
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tres (msc) and other elements such as VLRs, HLR, PSTN,
GMSC as well as traffic and user’s movement generator.
Both calls and handover blocking probabilities were se-
lected as the basic measures of the QoS for DS-CDMA
system. These measures were also used for assessment of
HCA algorithm efficiency.
The following system’s parameters were assumed for sim-
ulation:
– UL/DL carrier frequency: 1922.6/2112.6 MHz;
– chip rate: 3.84 Mchps;
– propagation model: COST 231 Walfish-Ikegami;
– user’s effective data rate: 12.2, 64, 144, 384;
– user’s activity coefficient: 100% (0.75 Erl per user);
– mobile station (UE – user equipment) max. power:
21 dBm;
– UE antenna gain: 0 dB;
– base station (NB) max. power: 43 dBm;
– NB antenna gain: 10 dB;
– UE and NB sensitivity:  110 dBm;
– handover type: soft (2 base stations in the active set).
In CDMA systems interferences can be caused both by
users and base stations, as it is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Interferences caused by users UE (a) and by base sta-
tions NB (b).
The required level of Eb=N0 in NB location (Uplink – UL)
is:
 
Eb
N0
!
req
=
Pod  (SF)
Iintra NB + Iinter NB +N0
; (3)
where: SF – spreading factor, Pod – received signal
power, Iintra NB; Iinter NB – intra and intercell interfer-
ences, N0 – noise power density.
Let us assume that power control is performed ideally. It
means that signal power at NB receiver input incoming
from all UEs is exactly the same:
Lnb1 P
n
nad1 = : : : = L
n
bmn P
n
nadmn ; (4)
where: Lnb1 – signal attenuation in cell n from UE1,
Pnnad1 – transmitted signal power by UE1 in cell n; mk –
number of UEs.
So, the signal power received by NBn from UEk is as fol-
lows:
Pod = L
n
bk P
n
nadk : (5)
The level of intracell interferences that influence UEk is
defined as:
Iintra NB = L
n
b1 P
n
nad1 + : : :+L
n
bk 1 P
n
nadk 1 +
+Lnbk+1 P
n
nadk+1 + : : :+L
n
bmn P
n
nadmn (6)
and level of intercell interferences as:
Iinter NB =
m1
å
i=1
L1b1 P
1
nadi + : : :+
mn 1
å
i=1
Ln 1bi P
n 1
nadi +
+
mn+1
å
i=1
Ln+1bi P
n+1
nadi + : : :+
mL
å
i=1
LLbi P
L
nadi ; (7)
where: L – number of base stations in the system,
m1; m2; : : : ; mn; : : : ; mL – number of active users.
A similar situation is in downlink (DL) calculations. The
required level of Eb=N0 in UE can be written as:
 
Eb
N0
!
req
=
Pod  (SF)
Iintra UE + Iinter UE +N0
; (8)
where: Iintra UE; Iinter UE – intra and intercell interference
that can be calculated from:
Iintra UE = L
n
bk
 
Pnnad1 + : : :+P
n
nadk +
+Pnnadk+1 + : : :+P
n
nadmn

(9)
and
Iinter UE = L
1
bk
m1
å
i=1
P1nadi + : : :+L
n 1
bk
mn 1
å
i=1
Pn 1
nadi +
+Ln+1bk
mn+1
å
i=1
Pn+1
nadi + : : :+L
L
bk
mL
å
i=1
PLnadi : (10)
Above functional equations describe DS-CDMA system be-
haviour. During simulation, required Eb=N0 can be calcu-
lated and on this basis the decision concerning the calls
or the handovers blocking is made. Such a situation takes
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place when Eb=N0 exceeds the level shown in Table 1. In
this case dynamic channel assignment procedure is running.
Table 1
Required level of Eb=N0
Effective data rate [kbit/s] 12.2 64 144 384
Uplink 5.1 1.7 0.9 0.9
Downlink 7.9
Figures 5 – 10 show the simulation results. Standard chan-
nels assignment scheme based on [7] and the HCA method
(denoted in the figures as the modified) are compared.
Fig. 5. Call blocking probability versus number of UEs.
Fig. 6. Call blocking probability versus mean velocity of UEs.
Fig. 7. Handover blocking probability versus number of UEs.
Fig. 8. Handover blocking probability versus mean velocity
of UE.
Fig. 9. Handover blocking probability versus soft handover re-
gion.
Fig. 10. Call blocking probability versus UE effective data rate.
The influence of the number of UEs on QoS measures is
shown in Figs. 5 and 7. The traffic intensity in the system
in this case varies from 1500 Erl to 3000 Erl.
Call and handover blocking probabilities versus mean ve-
locity of UEs are shown in Figs. 6 and 8.
Handover blocking probability versus so-called soft han-
dover region is shown in Fig. 9. The soft handover region
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is defined here as the ratio of cell radius and radius of the
circle, where UE starts soft handover process.
Calls blocking probability versus UE effective data rate is
presented in Fig. 10.
5. Conclusion
On the basis of the simulation results shown in pre-
vious section, we can notice that HCA scheme signifi-
cantly decreases calls and handover blocking probability
in comparison with the standard method. The QoS im-
provement is particularly visible in case of high system
load, where HCA can effectively manage the channels. The
same situation is when UEs increase their velocity. In the
microcellular systems, number of users crossing the cell
boundary is very high. So the traffic caused by this ef-
fect is high (even higher then basic traffic). By using HCA
we can see significant increase the QoS for higher user’s
velocity.
From Fig. 10 we can notice that the blocking probability
is very high for effective data rates above 12.2 kbit/s. It is
caused by high traffic (the same for all data rates) gener-
ated by the users. Summarising we can conclude that the
proposed channel allocation method seems to be suitable
for third generation cellular system.
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